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PROPERTY’S EDGES 
DAVID A. DANA* 
NADAV SHOKED** 
Abstract: Property law thinking normally assumes that the protection afford-
ed an owner does not vary in intensity across the owned asset. Property rights’ 
legal potency can differ between different assets, but not within a given asset. 
This Article argues that this assumption is wrong—and that when lawmakers 
pretend that it is not, detrimental results ensue. This Article demonstrates that, 
in fact, property law distinguishes the edges of an asset from its core. For 
good normative reasons, the law recognizes much weaker ownership rights in 
the edges of an asset—the areas lying close to the private property boundary 
line—than at its core. The law conceives the edges of any private property as 
a space where private and public interests inevitably interact and where both 
must somehow be accommodated. But, because this doctrinal and normative 
reality has heretofore gone largely unacknowledged, lawmakers are prone to 
ignore it, particularly when new technologies or geophysical phenomena in-
troduce new activities into the edges of a property or when advances in sci-
ence improve society’s grasp of the effects of existing activities there. As 
judges, legislators, and regulators instinctively resort to a misleading notion of 
unitary private property protections across the relevant asset, they hamper at-
tempts at effectively accommodating new challenges materializing at the as-
set’s edges, such as those presented by lead water pipes, drones, rising sea 
levels, and the digital revolution. Moving past the unitary vision of property, 
and drawing instead on its novel theoretical analysis, this Article suggests 
specific edges solutions to such problems. The Article’s introduction of a new 
framework for understanding property law protections—the property edges 
theory—thus not only contributes to existing scholarly discourse, but also aids 
in tackling daunting real-world property law puzzles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the opening lines of her book Property and Persuasion, Carol Rose 
invites the reader to “[p]icture property. Use your mind’s eye: what do you 
see?”1 She suggests that in many minds the image materializing is that of a 
fence, dilapidated as the fence might be, just like the one pictured on the 
book’s cover. This is a very strong image, Rose explains, because it embod-
ies something foundational about property. The fence conveys a property 
owner’s assertion: “[t]his is mine.”2 On one side of the fence lies the own-
er’s private realm—her home—on the other, the realm of others—neighbors 
or the public. Property is all about the dividing line between those two 
realms. 
What legal meaning does the line carry though? What transformation 
in rights and liabilities occurs as one crosses that line? Consider again the 
proverbial fence. Beyond that fence, on the owner’s side, lies their home—
their “castle”—where they exercise many rights and where they owe little 
to the public.3 The home, however, is unlikely to be the only thing situated 
on the owner’s side of the fence. Between the fence and the home one might 
find trees facing the street, a mailbox, gas and electricity meters; above 
there is open air; below water- and sewage-lines, underground minerals, and 
soil. With respect to none of these places and things does the owner enjoy 
the same broad legal rights and freedoms, to the exclusion of public rights, 
that the owner enjoys inside their own home—even though, just like the 
home, these places are all on “the owner’s” side of the fence. For example, 
the owner must maintain the trees so as not to cause harm to the street;4 
they must keep the mailbox and meters and allow others access to them;5 
                                                                                                                           
 1 CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 1 (1994). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, ch. 
73, at 162 (1797) (“For a man’s house is his castle, et domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugi-
um . . . [and each man’s home is his safest refuge].”). 
 4 See, e.g., Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So. 2d 210, 222 (Fla. 2001) (holding that landowners, 
who were owners of a commercial service station on the property, had a duty to properly maintain 
the foliage “consistent with the safe egress and ingress of vehicles attracted to the business and 
persons affected thereby”); Gibson v. Denton, 38 N.Y.S. 554, 556 (App. Div. 1896) (suggesting 
that a cause of injury exists where “an unsound tree, standing on premises of a party near the 
house of his neighbor, [that is] liable, in any wind, to fall down upon it, and which the owner of 
the tree, after notice of its condition, neglected to remove”); Rosengren v. City of Seattle, 205 
P.3d 909, 914 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that “trees planted by a landowner are an artificial 
condition on the land, and that an abutting land owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care that 
the trunks, branches, or roots of trees planted by them adjacent to a public sidewalk do not pose an 
unreasonable risk of harm to a pedestrian using the sidewalk”). 
 5 See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 128–29 (1981) 
(noting that mailboxes are “an essential part of the [Postal Service’s] nationwide system for the de-
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they cannot stop planes from flying in the air above;6 they cannot interfere 
with the water- and sewage-lines below or with the support their soil offers 
to neighboring properties,7 nor do they necessarily own the underground 
minerals.8 Much is located between the home and the fence, and not all of it 
enjoys quite the same legal status as the home. The same is true on the oth-
erthe publicside of the fence. Thus, for example, the owner may have 
no personal rights in the public roadway, but they have an individual duty to 
maintain the public sidewalk abutting their land and the water-line running 
underneath it;9 a discrete right to plant vegetation along that sidewalk 
(along the space between sidewalk and street that is sometimes known as a 
                                                                                                                           
livery and receipt of mail”). A mailbox must abide by the United States Postal Service’s (USPS’s) 
regulations. See Engineering Standards and Specifications for Mail Receptacles, U.S. POSTAL SERV., 
https://about.usps.com/publications/engineering-standards-specifications.htm [https://perma.cc/
SDX2-UWY2] (providing standards for wall-mounted mail receptacles and curbside mailboxes). 
USPS is not only assured access to the mailbox, but is the only entity allowed to access it. FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWS THAT APPLY DIFFERENTLY TO THE UNITED STATES 
POSTAL SERVICE AND ITS PRIVATE COMPETITORS 6, 17 (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/accounting-laws-apply-differently-united-states-postal-service-and-its-
private-competitors-report/080116postal.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE3G-3BRE]. Because govern-
ment agencies require a mailing address—for example, for jury duty summons or IRS tax re-
turns—the ability to refrain from having a mailbox is limited. See USPS, MAILING STANDARDS 
OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL ch. 508, § 3.1.4 (2018) 
[hereinafter DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL], https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/508.htm#ep1051804 
[https://perma.cc/7859-4TXN] (providing that “[i]f USPS employees are impeded in reaching a 
mail receptacle, the postmaster may withdraw delivery service”). The USPS also limits the ability 
to rely on private mailboxes. Michael Brick, Private Mailbox Services Call New Postal Rules 
Unfair, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1999, at C2, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/06/business/private-
mailbox-services-call-new-postal-rules-unfair.html [https://perma.cc/2AUA-CGNF]. 
 6 See infra notes 103–114 and accompanying text (discussing aerial navigation). 
 7 See infra notes 199–253 and accompanying text (discussing water lines and lead poisoning); 
see also 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITIONS § 69.01 (2018) (explaining lateral 
and subjacent support rights and obligations). 
 8 See 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 7, § 50.11(i) (discussing administrative 
regulation of groundwater in the western United States); see also Nadav Shoked, Two Hundred 
Years of Spite, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 357, 374–83 (2016) (discussing the general common law re-
garding landowners’ rights to percolating waters). 
 9 See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Proper-
ty Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2031–32 (2012) (discussing owners’ 
statutory obligation to shovel snow from adjoining sidewalks). 
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“planting strip,” “tree lawn,” or “hellstrip”);10 perhaps even a special right 
to have obstacles removed from the adjacent public street.11 
There is thus a distinct physical and legal space between the fence and 
what is the quintessential private property on the one side, and between the 
fence and what is the quintessential public property on the other side. That 
space represents, this Article argues, property’s edges. In this Article, we 
explain why it is useful to think of property, not in the binary terms of pri-
vate ownership and the boundary that separates private ownership from that 
which is publicly owned—the thinking embodied in the popular preoccupa-
tion with the fencebut instead in terms of a private core, boundary, and 
edges found on both sides of the boundary. 
First and foremost, this framework provides a better description of ac-
tual legal reality. As the examples above illustrate, the law simply does not 
treat all spaces that fall on the same side of the private/public boundary in 
the same manner. An owner has a more robust right, for example, to exclude 
others from their home than from the air above it (where airplanes might 
traverse) or from the entrances to it (where the mailbox or meter might be 
located). The owner also has a stronger right to freely designate the use of 
their property in their home than in the soil below (where the water-line is 
located) or the yard adjacent to the street (where they must ensure that trees 
are not felled). Similarly, the owner’s rights to influence the use of land, and 
their obligations with respect to land, do not abruptly end at the spot where 
their private property ends, at the boundary line: those rights and obliga-
tions extend, to some degree, to the areas (such as the sidewalk) immediate-
ly beyond it. 
A realistic property theory should acknowledge these facts. The law ap-
pears to conceive our ownership regime not as a stark choice between private 
and publicmine and not mine, separated by a boundary—but as a continu-
um. That continuum starts at a core of private ownership—where the owner’s 
rights are strongest (albeit never absolute)and proceeds towards the oppo-
site polewhere the owner’s rights are weakest (albeit never non-existent). 
The boundary is probably an important point along that continuum; it is, in a 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See, e.g., SEATTLE DEP’T OF TRANS., GARDENING IN PLANTING STRIPS, CLIENT ASSIS-
TANCE MEMO 2305, at 1, 3 (2017), http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/SDOT/Public
SpaceManagement/CAM2305.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYQ8-3PJJ] (“A permit is not required to 
install vegetation in a planting strip.”). But see id. at 1 (“However, a free Street Use permit is re-
quired to install trees and raised beds.”). 
 11 Traditionally, public nuisance claims could only be brought by public officials or private 
owners whose property was specially affected in a way not shared by the general public. 
8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 7, § 67.02(a). 
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sense, an inflection point (where the formal categories of ownership switch). 
Still, however, it is just one point along a wider continuum. 
Better appreciation of this positive fact about our property law should 
aid both lawmakers and scholars. Lawmakers’ occasional failure to note the 
complex nature of property leads to problematic decisions with respect to 
activities taking place on private properties’ edges. This periodic failure is 
most conspicuous and generates the most troubling outcomes at times when 
new services or technologies that must make use of a property’s edge are 
introduced.12 
Consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous 1982 decision in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.13 There, the Court could not imagine 
a new technology situated on a property’s edge—in that case, cable televi-
sion wires being placed onto a landlord’s roof and the air space above it—as 
anything but an intrusion into the owner’s core property. For Justice Mar-
shall, the boundary between private and public property was decisive, and 
once the government-mandated wires were placed on the private side, a 
physical intrusion—and thus, a governmental taking of private property—
had immediately occurred. The Court thus held that such an intrusion was 
actionable regardless of the intrusion’s miniscule scope (about one-eighth of 
a cubic foot) or lack of influence on the owner’s use of her property (the 
owner did not even note the intruding wires for five years after acquiring 
the property).14 
Rejecting this highly formalistic focus on the boundary between pri-
vate and public property, Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, correct-
ly conceived the issue as, to employ the term this Article introduces, an 
edges problem. Justice Blackmun drew on the example of other, very simi-
lar, public regulations allowable in other edges lying outside the core of pri-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 193–210 and accompanying text. 
 13 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The case involved a cable television company placing cable wires and 
boxes on a landlord’s roof, the side of her building, and the space above the roof. Under New 
York state law aimed at protecting the interests of tenants, a landlord was required to permit such 
installation of cable television wires. Although the landlord in Loretto did not initially notice the 
wires when she purchased the property, she later contested the wires’ continued placement as an 
unconstitutional taking. The Court agreed. Id. at 421–24, 441. 
 14 Id. at 421. As Justice Marshall noted: 
The dissent asserts that a taking of about one-eighth of a cubic foot of space is not of 
constitutional significance. The assertion appears to be factually incorrect, since it 
ignores the two large silver boxes that appellant identified as part of the installa-
tion. . . . In any event, these facts are not critical: whether the installation is a taking 
does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a bread-
box. 
Id. at 438 n.16 (citations omitted). 
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vate property—for example, laws requiring mailboxes’ placement.15 Like 
these, the intrusion considered in the case, could not, to Justice Blackmun’s 
mind, be legally treated as the equivalent of an intrusion into the home. The 
New York Court of Appeals, to which the case was remanded, also arguably 
diverged in its attitude from Justice Marshall’s boundary-focused approach. 
The Court of Appeals found that the one dollar paid to the owner was suffi-
cient just compensation for the taking of her property, evidently not perceiv-
ing the intrusion into the roof and side of the owner’s building as the equiv-
alent of an intrusion into the owner’s living room.16 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Loretto majority decision has not fared 
well as precedent. It is generally critiqued as incoherent.17 The Court itself 
has been unable to abide by the “rule” it announced—whereby all physical 
invasions, irrespective of extent or effect, are takings—generating a seem-
ingly endless stream of contradictory decisions.18 
The Supreme Court’s unworkable Loretto ruling, as well as judicial 
opinions and legislative regulations in other doctrinal disputes that this Arti-
cle will discuss, exemplifies the perverse results that follow when courts 
insist on analyzing problems through the boundary prism. In one example 
that we elaborate upon below, mindless adherence to this unitary property 
approach has undermined attempts to effectively replace old lead water-
lines, imperiling the health of millions of Americans.19 The simplistic focus 
on private versus public induces courts to content themselves with answer-
ing the question of who holds formal title to the land, without proceeding to 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Id. at 452–53 (citation omitted) (contending that “[s]tates traditionally—and constitutional-
ly—have exercised their police power ‘to require landlords to . . . provide utility connections, 
mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common area of a building’”). 
See generally DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, supra note 5 (providing physical standards necessary for 
residential mailboxes and alternative requirements for receiving postal mail). 
 16 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 431, 435 (N.Y. 1983). 
 17 See, e.g., DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 96–99 (2002); 
Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad Hoc Regula-
tory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 121, 
127–28 (2003). Even authors who reckon that the Court reached the correct result argue that it 
cannot flow from the equation of the cable-wiring requirement to a physical intrusion into the 
home. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the 
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 948 (1996). 
 18 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 704–11 (5th ed. 2017); see also, e.g., Yee v. City of 
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522, 531 (1992) (upholding a rent control law that prohibited a land-
lord’s eviction of mobile home owners from rented spaces unless and only if the landlord demon-
strated that they wished to convert the property to non-rental use, differentiating prior cases that 
“generally require[d] compensation” as only applying to government-forced occupation by 
strangers); FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251 (1987) (holding that Congress could regu-
late rents that utility companies charged cable television companies to use utility poles, noting that 
the rule announced in Loretto was “very narrow”). 
 19 See infra notes 199–253 and accompanying text. 
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the much more important follow-up questions: what values that title in the 
specific space is supposed to protect—and, in accordance, what legal pow-
ers should be available to the title holder?20 
Shifting to an idea of property as a continuum of legal entitlements 
that unfolds over space can thus aid courts in dealing with new challenges; 
it can also contribute to property theory. The past few decades have wit-
nessed an explosion of sophisticated work on property law theory.21 The 
edges framework can integrate key insights of many of the most influential 
contending theories developed in these important works. Specifically, the 
edges vision preserves a place for the “thing” (or space) in our understand-
ing of property law—a key insight of one group of writerswhile still giv-
ing primacy to the social nature of property—the key insight of the other 
group.22 
Through this act of theoretical synthesis, this Article develops a better 
understanding of our notion of property. Such an understanding is especially 
urgent nowadays as diverse stakeholders make recourse to traditional proper-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1464–65 (1996) (suggesting that because property rights have 
always been “contextual, changing over time, and dependent on the effects their exercise has on 
others,” the title model whereby formal ownership allegedly determines results should be aban-
doned in favor of a nuisance model that “expressly qualifies property rights by reference to their 
effects on other property owners and on the public at large”). 
 21 See generally, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law 
Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (2014) (arguing that property law’s true goal is human flourishing, 
rather than other private values like individual autonomy and personal security); Hanoch Dagan, 
The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517 (2003) (arguing that both the modern description of 
property as a bundle of rights and the older conception of property as forms should be incorpo-
rated into a realist approach to property); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in 
Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008) (exploring the shortfalls of the numerus clausus 
principle, standardization, and pluralism conceptions of property); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting 
Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009) (exploring inalienability rules as tools for achieving 
efficiency and other ends); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Inter-
face, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) (applying a functional explanation for why the legal system 
distinguishes between in personam contract right and in rem property rights); Carol M. Rose, The 
Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897 (2007); Joseph William Singer, Demo-
cratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (SPECIAL 
ISSUE) 1009 (2009) (exploring the human moral aspects within recognition of property); Henry E. 
Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Law of 
Things] (challenging the modern, realist conception of property as a bundle of rights, and instead 
examining the concept of property as “the law of things”); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Par-
chomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1015 (2008) 
(arguing that “[e]very property problem spans three distinct dimensions: number of owners, scope 
of each owner’s dominion, and asset design”); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 
VA. L. REV. 1889, 1893 (2005) (arguing that “theorists have generally overemphasized the degree 
to which private property enables owners to escape from communal coercion”). 
 22 See infra notes 33–67 and accompanying text (discussing current, unitary concepts of prop-
erty). 
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ty conceptions in order to analyze challenges presented by new, non-land 
based assets. Debates over the scope of different intellectual property rights—
such as copyright and trade secrets—have, for decades, been couched in 
terms of property boundary disputes; as scholars note, this analogy is often 
applied in a misleading fashion.23 Perhaps even more worrisome, over the 
past few months, popular and legislative disputes over privacy on the Internet 
and the allocation of rights to information between users, websites, and pro-
viders, have likewise extensively employedsomewhat thoughtlesslythe 
boundary-focused terms supposedly derived from traditional property law.24 
By questioning long-established precepts and offering a more accurate image 
of the legal treatment of the most traditional of property rights, this Article 
seeks to facilitate a better informed conversation regarding the legal reaction 
to such novel non-traditional properties.25 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates the suggested frame-
work within existing property scholarship.26 It provides a brief overview of 
the theoretical debates over the nature of property, concentrating on the role 
that the “thing” and the boundary line between the private and the public 
play in the conception of property. Part I also highlights the tendency of 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 969, 974–78, 983–85 (2007) (criticizing the use of trespass-to-land models in copy-
right); Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction, 122 
HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 62 (2009) (explaining that the current model of the copyright infringement 
claim is improperly based on the land trespass tort). See generally Patricia L. Bellia, Defending 
Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164 (2004) (discussing applications of land-style protection 
doctrines to unwanted uses of private computer systems); Jane K. Winn, Crafting a License to 
Know from a Privilege to Access, 79 WASH. L. REV. 285 (2004) (discussing the application of 
trespass doctrine to access to Internet facilities). 
 24 See Louis Menand, Why Do We Care So Much About Privacy? NEW YORKER (June 18, 
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/why-do-we-care-so-much-about-
privacy [https://perma.cc/5H8R-C48J]. Despite the continuous debate between tech companies 
seeking individuals’ private information and government entities seeking to protect such individu-
al interests, privacy interests are not “what’s really at stake . . . .” Id. (“[P]rivacy is simply a weap-
on that comes to hand in social combat. People invoke their right to privacy when it serves their 
interests . . . .”); see also Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1283, 1289–92 (2000) (criticizing early attempts to protect data privacy through property 
concepts).  
 25 Another recent, technology-generated legal dispute for which the edges model, replacing 
the unitary one, could be useful involves the embedding of tweets containing copyrighted material 
into online news stories. Two federal courts have issued apparently contradicting rulings on this 
point. Compare Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (holding that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s exclusive display right under copyright 
law when they embedded tweets on a website), with Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Google’s framing and hyperlinking aspects of its 
search engine tool constituted a fair use of an adult entertainment magazine’s online images be-
cause the use was highly transformative). 
 26 See infra notes 30–67 and accompanying text. 
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property theories of different stripes to offer a unitary notion of private 
property—one that assumes that property entitlements are consistent across 
the owned space. Part II argues that this unitary view is misleading, focus-
ing on three key doctrinal issues—trespass, aerial navigation, and police 
searches—to illustrate that the law explicitly denies the unitary conception 
of property. It then explains why the law has made this choice, examining 
the benefits of the edges notion of property. Specifically, our analysis of the 
three doctrinal issues demonstrates how, in contrast with the unitary proper-
ty view, the edges concept better promotes the normative values on behalf 
of which private property was instituted (efficient land use and privacy), 
better corresponds to individuals’ expectations respecting private entitle-
ments, and better economizes on administrative costs.27 Next, Part III em-
ploys the edges theory developed in Part II to address several pressing 
property law challenges.28 It turns attention to instances where, faced with 
some new development affecting the edges of private property, lawmakers 
have insisted on relying upon the unitary, boundary-based approach to 
property. Part III shows how this attitude engenders extremely dangerous 
results in the specific context of the challenges presented by lead water-
pipes, drones, and rising sea levels. Drawing on the suggested edges theory, 
Part III proposes more appropriate legal solutions to these challenges. Part 
IV concludes by offering a potential extension of the property edges theory 
beyond its focus on real property—to intellectual property.29 
I. CURRENT THEORIES: A UNITARY CONCEPT OF PROPERTY 
This Article suggests a new view of property—one imagining property 
as a continuum proceeding from a core of private entitlement, to private 
edges, to public edges, and then to a public core. This view inevitably re-
lates, and reacts, to existing views prevalent in the theoretical literature. 
This Part reviews that rich literature and its concept of property. It exposes 
the literature’s sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, adherence to a uni-
tary vision of property, which the remainder of the Article will rebuke. 
Nevertheless, this Part also gleans from that literature potential building 
blocks that can later be used to address this shortcoming.30 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See infra notes 68–188 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 189–310 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 311–353 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 31–67 and accompanying text. 
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The canonical starting point for the evolution of property theory and 
law’s idea of private property has always been William Blackstone.31 For 
Blackstone, property was “that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things in the world, in total exclusion 
of the right of any other individual in the universe.”32 For over a century 
now, however, property theory has tried to come to terms with the collapse 
of this physical, absolutist property conception. In the early-twentieth cen-
tury, legal realists successfully assailed the conception.33 They argued that 
property is not about the physical thing; rather, it is about relationships be-
tween people.34 For example, applying an oft-invoked illustration, as an 
owner, Jane does not exercise a dominion over the external thing, the land 
of Blackacre. Instead, Jane exercises a dominion over other people whom 
she may be able to exclude from Blackacre.35 Relatedly, the realists be-
lieved that defining something as property does not proffer the owner abso-
lute rights.36 Even as owner, Jane might not be free to exercise the right to 
exclude all others in all circumstances from Blackacre.37 Property, there-
fore, is a “bundle of rights” that are exercised over other individuals rather 
than things, a bundle that need not include all imaginable rights. 
The precise origins of the “bundle of rights” metaphor are unclear,38 
but it nicely conveys the core realist tenet: “property” is a hollow, formalis-
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 
601 (“Since Blackstone’s time, his definition of property as exclusive dominion has been cited 
again and again.”). 
 32 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 33 See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 
438–51 (1930) (distinguishing between abstract legal verbalisms and concrete empirical facts 
while highlighting the inherent ambiguities of concepts). 
 34 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710–11, 743 (1917) (arguing that a property right “really involves 
as many separate and distinct ‘right-duty’ relations as there are persons subject to a duty”). 
 35 See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 1–4 (AM. LAW INST. 1936) (providing explanations 
and illustrations regarding basic rights, privileges, and immunities surrounding the legal relations 
between persons with respect to things). 
 36 See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 (1998) (“Hohfeld 
argued that property rights do not define absolute dominion of people over things, but instead 
define shifting relationships among people.”). 
 37 See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 637 
(1988) (explaining the fallacies with the popular assumption that a property owner ‘has ultimate 
control over the disposition of a thing or a set of resources”). 
 38 But see Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights?, 8 ECON. J. 
WATCH 193, 194, 195 (2011) (explaining that, although the “bundle of rights” view of property is 
widespread today, the term emerged in the late-nineteenth century “in the age of expanding de-
mocracy and collectivism,” and expanded thereafter). 
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tic concept of no practical usefulness.39 The fixation on “things,” long asso-
ciated with thinking about property, is particularly puerile to this more so-
phisticated realist view.40 The result has been, as famously announced by 
Thomas Gray, a disconnect between the common perception of property 
and the legal-scholarly idea: 
Most people, including most specialists in their unprofessional 
moments, conceive of property as things that are owned by per-
sons. To own property is to have exclusive control of some-
thing—to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, 
leave it idle, or destroy it. . . . By contrast, the theory of property 
rights held by the modern specialist tends both to dissolve the no-
tion of ownership and to eliminate any necessary connection be-
tween property rights and things.41 
This contrast may render the bundle image somewhat unappealing, as 
Bruce Ackerman noted decades ago.42 Even if legally accurate, the image 
materializes as highly abstract43 and as misaligned with the actual lived ex-
perience of property—which, often enough, is all about the statement “that 
house is mine.”44 Accordingly, in a series of highly influential articles pub-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 
1086 (1984) (“[P]roperty is simply a label for whatever ‘bundle of sticks’ the individual has been 
granted.”); Williams, supra note 36, at 297 (“Labeling something as property does not predeter-
mine what rights an owner does or does not have in it.”). 
 40 See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 118–35 (1937) (insisting that 
traditional notions of private property, as expressed through the language of law and of econom-
ics, were too simple and formal to usefully understand the contemporary economy’s complexity); 
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 
815 (1935) (“The circularity of legal reasoning in the whole field of unfair competition is veiled 
by the ‘thingification’ of property.”). 
 41 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII, at 69, 69 
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
 42 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26–27 (1977) (argu-
ing that “it risks serious confusion to identify any single individual as the owner of any particular 
thing”; instead, Ackerman suggests, identifying someone as a property “owner” merely serves “as 
a shorthand for identifying the holder of that bundle of rights which contains a range of entitle-
ments more numerous or more valuable than the bundle held by any other person with respect to 
the thing in question”). 
 43 Consider this realist era definition of property: “a euphonious collocation of letters which 
serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the commonwealth.” 
Walton H. Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
528, 528 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1937). 
 44 See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 75–76 (1997) (“As I walk through a car 
park, my actual, practical duty is only capable of being understood as a duty which applies to the 
cars there, not to a series of owners. . . . The content of my duty not to interfere is not structured in 
any way by the actual ownership relation of the cars’ owners to their specific cars. . . . Thus trans-
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lished over the past two decades, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith instigat-
ed a revolt against the realist bundle of rights view.45 They have argued that 
property as a legal category must, and does, have a well-defined essence. To 
differing degrees, they and their followers—the “essentialist theorists”—
contend that this essence is the right to exclude.46 Even more recently, 
Smith has taken the argument a few steps further still.47 Fully reversing 
course from legal realism, he argues that property’s essence is the thing, 
with respect to which the owner has certain rights—most prominently, the 
right to exclude—against the whole world.48 To Smith and others,49 the cor-
rect representation of property is not the bundle of sticks, or even the ab-
stract legal right to exclude, but the physical piece of property—the house 
on a lot—which everyone in the world knows is off-limits.50 
This new/old representation of property is by no means universally 
embraced. Joseph Singer, for example, argues that property is not about pro-
tecting the owner’s right to a thing or to exclude, but about protecting indi-
viduals’ legitimate reliance on certain relationships organized around as-
sets.51 Gregory Alexander insists further that property law actually includes 
a socio-obligation norm to employ resources in a manner furthering human 
                                                                                                                           
actions between an owner and a specific other do not change the duties of everyone else not to 
interfere with the property.”). 
 45 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (arguing for a positive theo-
ry of the numerus clausus, and explaining how property rights are different from contract rights in 
that they are restricted to a limited number of standardized forms); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (trac-
ing the worrisome rise of the modern legal economists’ view of property as simply a list of rights, 
and advocating instead for a return to the conception of property as a distinctive in rem right). 
 46 See PENNER, supra note 44, at 71 (“[T]he right to property is a right to exclude others from 
things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things.”); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998) (“My claim is simply that in 
demarcating the line between ‘property’ and ‘nonproperty’ . . . [,] the right to exclude others is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the existence of property.”); Adam Mossoff, 
What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 439 (2003) (identify-
ing “the right to exclude as the essential hallmark of the concept of ‘property’”). 
 47 Henry Smith’s new notion builds on his essentialist ideas because it too is grounded in the 
insight that focusing on things economizes on information costs. See Henry E. Smith, The Persis-
tence of System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2066 (2015). 
 48 Smith, Law of Things, supra note 21, at 1699, 1704, 1710, 1725. 
 49 See, e.g., Simon Douglas & Ben McFarlane, Defining Property Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 219, 223–26, 233–37 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 
2013) (arguing that property is primarily the right to exclude from a physical thing). 
 50 See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 21, at 1699 (“The right to exclude, the residual claim, 
and so on are not detachable sticks serving detachable purposes. They are integral—but not abso-
lute—aspects of property that follow from its architecture.”). 
 51 Singer, supra note 37, at 663–64. 
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flourishing, not just for the individual owner, but for all.52 For these schol-
ars and their followers, property is not about the thing or the individual’s 
rights; rather, it is about the social relationships—the overall structure of 
society—that property establishes.53 This thinking argues that, given its so-
cial role, property cannot revolve around an individual’s right to exclude 
others; indeed, it cannot revolve around any one single right or interest.54 
Property is about obligations towards others.55 Those obligations can—and 
often do—limit the owner’s rights on her thing.56 These “pluralistic theo-
ries” of property thus highlight property law doctrines that deny the owner a 
right to exclude.57 Scholars adhering to these theories bring to the fore cases 
in which the owner is subject to duties to accommodate others by granting 
them entry or by complying with their dictates respecting the land’s uses.58 
For their part, the essentialist theories relegate the doctrines that plural-
ists emphasize to property law’s periphery.59 Essentialists acknowledge 
these doctrines’ and cases’ existence but insist that they are mere exceptions 
to the general rule of property law, which remains the owner’s right to ex-
clude.60 The essentialist-pluralist debate thus revolves around the determi-
                                                                                                                           
 52 Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 COR-
NELL L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 745, 748–49 (2009). 
 53 See PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 3, 5 (2013) (arguing 
that property is about what “we owe each other”). 
 54 See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 743, 743–44 (2009) (arguing that “[p]roperty implicates plural and incommen-
surable values”); Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist 
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 654–58 (2006) (“By a pluralist account, I mean one 
denying that a single theory can provide property regimes either adequate empirical explanation or 
normative orientation. From a pluralist perspective, property regimes, like other legal and social 
institutions, reflect a number of different values.”). 
 55 Alexander et al., supra note 54, at 743. 
 56 See Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 
CAL. L. REV. 107, 111–12 (2013) (“Limiting the owner’s right to exclude in light of the public 
interests at stake in private property is a common theme of progressive property scholarship, and 
in certain circumstances such limits can come close to promoting land redistribution.”). 
 57 See Alexander, supra note 52, at 773–810 (providing examples of legal doctrines that 
demonstrate the role of a socio-obligation norm in property law’s limitations of owners’ right to 
exclude). 
 58 See Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 463–91 (2014) (arguing that 
several doctrines demonstrate that current property law imposes on an owner a positive “duty to 
maintain” his or her property and thus compels an owner’s accommodation of the public through 
various types of sanctions). 
 59 See Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 959, 980–81 
(2009) (contending that the examples that Gregory Alexander “are better handled under a regime 
that gives presumptive weight to owners’ exclusion rights and to traditional legal categories than 
under his [pluralist] alternative”). 
 60 See id. at 988 (“The structure of property in terms of a core and periphery, or exclusion and 
governance, is no accident.”). 
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nation of which doctrines form the heart of property law. For essentialists, 
“property proper includes a basic exclusionary regime with refinements of 
the governance type” that might impose on the owner some rules limiting 
his or her land’s use.61 For pluralists, “[g]overnance property now domi-
nates the landscape of property institutions. As a result[,] . . . the right to 
exclude can no longer be considered the single most important element of 
ownership.”62 
The two sides concur that there are properties and property rights of 
different potencies (in terms of degree of protection of the right to exclude); 
they dispute, though, which type of property is more prevalent. They agree 
that the boundary between private property and public space (or the proper-
ty of others) matters; they dispute how much it matters.63 Neither view ex-
plicitly acknowledges, however, the possibility that the strength of the pro-
tection of the property right to exclude differs across the same property (as 
opposed to between properties). Additionally, neither view focuses on the 
impact, on the owner’s right to exclude, of a given spot’s distance from the 
property’s boundary (as opposed to the impact of the boundary itself). 
In this sense, both schools assume a unitary vision of property.64 Under 
both schools’ approach, the owner’s entitlements in a given property—strong 
as they might be for the essentialists, weak as they might be for the plural-
ists—are the same throughout that property.65 Whether they emphasize the 
thing owned, the right to exclude, or relationships, theorists proceed with 
the often-undeclared presumption that once a right is recognized with re-
spect to a thing, the scope of that right does not vary across the thing. They 
conceive the major, perhaps only, point where a property right’s import 
shifts (and the theories diverge in their diagnosis of that shift’s intensity) as 
the boundary-line between private property and public property. 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S456 (2002). 
 62 Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1887 (2012). 
 63 Compare id. (arguing that the conception of ownership depicted by the fence metaphor is 
misleading), with Smith, supra note 47, at 2057 (“Property divides the world of horizontal interac-
tions into modules, . . . which allow intensive activity inside boundaries . . . .”). 
 64 Our usage of the term “unitary,” especially in its application to theories that we otherwise 
deem pluralistic, might require elucidation. The realists-progressives are pluralistic with respect to 
the values they seek to promote through property, the nature of the entitlements they deem as 
covered under the property rubric, and the number and identity of stakeholders who might enjoy 
rights in a given property. But they are, like the essentialist theorists, often unitary in one respect 
relevant here: they emphasize the fact that a property right embodies a plethora of diverse rela-
tionships that might differ across rights, but they do not always extend this insight to conclude 
that, within the same property right, such variation might exist. 
 65 See Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change, 91 TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2030 (2013) (ex-
plaining that, although property does not exist as a coherent idea and, hence, theoretical debates 
abound, its uncontested essence is the idea of legal protection of fixed entitlements). 
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The next Part of this Article will question the descriptive validity of 
this unitary vision that, despite their many other differences, the contending 
property theories share.66 The more nuanced edges vision that it advances in 
its stead will owe much, however, to other key insights of these theories—
both essentialist and pluralist. The edges framework we develop to replace 
the unitary view of property highlights the importance of the actual thing to 
the legal idea of property, as stressed by essentialists like Henry Smith.67 
The edges framework also assumes the contextual and shifting nature of 
property protections, which the pluralists teach. Our view that entitlements 
vary across the thing owned builds both on Smith’s idea that the physical 
thing matters and, concurrently, on the pluralist tenet that what matters in 
property is not formal ownership but rather the specific, and flexible, enti-
tlements that owners hold towards others. 
II. AN EDGES CONCEPT OF PROPERTY 
Prevailing theories of property maintain a largely unitary vision of 
property. Although they may recognize the distinct nature of different rights 
that can apply to land—for example, “exclusion” versus “governance” re-
gimes—they insist on the unchanging nature of the right across the specific 
piece of land. That position has much theoretical resonance and appeal. 
Still, as this Part explains, it stands in stark contrast to the way property is 
regulated by the law and experienced by owners and non-owners alike.68 
Indeed, this unitary view cannot account for the manner in which the most 
basic components of property law operate. To address this deficiency, in this 
Part, we develop a concept of private ownership that can: the property edg-
es concept. 
Section A shows that the unitary vision fails to accurately describe 
property law doctrine—which in fact clearly sets a property’s edges apart 
from its core.69 Section B explains why a view of property protections as 
varying over space is also more appealing as a theoretical matter, establish-
ing the normative grounding for the law’s choice to distinguish property’s 
edges from its core.70 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See infra notes 68–188 and accompanying text. 
 67 See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text (discussing the views of essentialists). Some 
realists-progressives also agree with this essentialist approach. For example, Laura Underkuffler 
stresses that “space” is vital to the concept of property. Laura S. Underkuffler, Subversive Proper-
ty, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 295, 301 (2016). 
 68 See infra notes 69–188 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 71–135 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 140–187 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Law Denying the Unitary Concept of Property 
First and foremost, the unitary view of property that the preceding Part 
detected in existing theories is descriptive. Its assumption is that property 
protections, as they exist in current and traditional law, do not vary within a 
property. In actuality, however, they do. In this Section, we expound on 
three examples from existing legal practice highlighting that fact.71 These 
instances—trespass law, aerial navigation law, and police searches law—
affect all property owners in America. They forcefully show that the law 
treats property not as a binary private/public choice, but as a spectrum pro-
ceeding from a core of intensely-protected private property into much less 
protected edges of private property that blend into the public space. 
1. Trespass Law 
Trespass is the most basic element of property law.72 Trespass laws are 
the legal tool that afford the owner control over her land; they allow the 
owner to decide who may and who may not enter, and they thus define 
property entitlements.73 Despite common assumptions, however, the proper-
ty right that trespass laws thereby define is not unitary; rather, it consists of 
a core of the property where the protection from uninvited entrants is ex-
tremely robust, as well as edges of the property where protection is much 
weaker—eventually fading to a point of having little practical significance. 
Trespass is both a crime and a tort. The most momentous power that 
the law grants an owner is the ability to draw on the state’s enforcement 
mechanism—the police—to remove and prosecute those who enter her land 
without permission.74 The legal system recognizes trespass—but not, say, 
breach of contract—as a crime.75 In this manner, commentators explain, 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See infra notes 72–135 and accompanying text. 
72 See Richard A. Epstein, How to Create—or Destroy—Wealth in Real Property, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 741, 741, 743, 744 (2007) (explaining how a clear right to exclude is necessary for economic 
welfare); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Can’t Buy Me Love: Monetary Versus In-Kind Remedies, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 185 (“The right of property owners to exclude others . . . is considered a 
vital component of ownership.”); Merrill, supra note 46, at 747–52 (arguing the right to exclude is 
the defining characteristic of property). 
 73 SINGER, supra note 18, at 27. 
 74 See Leo Katz, Choice, Consent and Cycling: The Hidden Limitations of Consent, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 627, 667, 668 (2006) (suggesting that the ability to rely on the police is what 
makes property rights strong). 
 75 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 55, 89 (2003) (“[U]nlike intentional violations of physical integrity or appropriations of 
another’s property, breaches of contract are not treated as crimes in any sophisticated legal sys-
tem.”). 
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society expresses its prioritization of private property.76 Yet, in practice, the 
law appears to prioritize certain parts of the property over others. For ex-
ample, in Illinois, a person is automatically liable for the crime of trespass if 
he or she enters a residence—the dwelling part of a property—without au-
thority.77 Entry to any other portion of a private property, however, will only 
count as a crime if the trespasser actually received, prior to the entry, warn-
ing from the owner that entry is forbidden.78 Even then, the crime qualifies 
as a lesser offense than entry into the dwelling portion.79 Other state crimi-
nal trespass statutes provide similar illustrations.80 
This non-unitary conception of property prevails not only in criminal 
law, but also in private law. The gradation system established by the tres-
pass crime reveals itself—if less explicitly—in the trespass tort. That tort, 
often referred to as property’s “sine quo non,”81 is of an alleged absolute 
nature.82 It applies evenly to all properties, and thus recognizes no excep-
tion for de minimis entries.83 Theoretically, if your neighbor’s dog relieves 
itself across your fence and into your lawn, the neighbor’s tort liability is 
identical to her liability in the case wherein that same dog engages in the 
same uninvited activity across your front door.84 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Laura S. Underkuffler, The Politics of Property and Need, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 363, 376 (2010). 
 77 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-4(a)(1) (West 2014) (“A person commits criminal 
trespass to a residence when, without authority, he or she knowingly enters or remains within any 
residence, including a house trailer that is the dwelling place of another.”). 
 78 See id. 5/21-3(a)(2). 
 79 Compare id. 5/19-4(b)(1) (Class A misdemeanor), with id. 5/21-3(h) (Class B misdemean-
or). 
 80 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1503 (1981) (non-residential structure); id. § 13-
1504(A)(1) (residential structure); id. § 13-1504(A)(2) (residential yard); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 511.060 (West 2018) (criminalizing trespass to dwelling); id. § 511.070 (to enclosed space); id. 
§ 511.080 (to premises); MO. ANN. STAT. § 569.140 (West 2018) (trespass to building); id. 
§ 569.150 (to any property). 
 81 See Merrill, supra note 46, at 730 (“[T]he right to exclude others is more than just ‘one of 
the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”). 
 82 Giddings v. Rogalewski, 158 N.W. 951, 953 (Mich. 1916) (“Every unauthorized intrusion 
upon the private premises of another is a trespass, and to unlawfully invade lands in his possession 
is ‘to break and enter his close’ and destroy his private and exclusive possession.”). Even com-
mentators disagreeing with this notion present their writing as mere suggestions. See, e.g., Larissa 
Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 302–03 (2008) (argu-
ing that trespass law should protect the owner’s agenda-setting authority, thus not extending to 
meritorious invasions). 
 83 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 
995 (2004). 
 84 See Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (defining trespass as 
simply “a physical intrusion upon the property of another without the proper permission from the 
person legally entitled to possession of that property”). 
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Although such liability might be the law in books, it is not the law in 
action.85 Tort law ends up distinguishing trespasses based on the intrusion’s 
location by means of the law’s remedy regime.86 As others have noted, the 
robust protection that the legal system provides to an owner through the 
minimal formal requirements needed to establish a trespass tort claim is 
undermined by the rather weak remedy that the tort provides.87 Trespass is a 
particularly pro-plaintiff tort because, in contrast to the usual practice in tort 
law, its proof does not require that the plaintiff suffer harm.88 Nevertheless, 
the remedy that courts award the successful trespass plaintiff depends on the 
presence of such harm.89 The remedy for trespass often consists of damages 
(an injunction is irrelevant once the trespasser has left), and these are almost 
always calculated to correspond to the harm that the trespass inflicted on the 
owner.90 In the absence of a harm, the owner is awarded nominal damages 
(usually, one dollar).91 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 30–31 (1910). 
 86 See Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1099 (2011) (explaining that 
“courts sometimes implicitly pardon trespassing by limiting the award in a trespass action”). The 
edges approach is also apparent in the law in Scotland and Sweden, which allows public access on 
unimproved, private land for “roaming” while making actionable any intrusion into cultivated 
areas and the area around a home, which the Swedish label the “tomt.” See Heidi Gorovitz Robert-
son, Public Access to Private Land for Walking: Environmental and Individual Responsibility as 
Rationale for Limiting the Right to Exclude, 23 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 215 (2011) 
(“[T]he public has a right of access to private land [in Sweden] that is not within the ‘tomt’—
because it, and cultivated areas, are the only areas to which the right of public access does not 
apply. As a result, the landowner may not put up a fence to exclude people from an area larger 
than the ‘tomt.’”); Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 
665, 684–88 (2011) (describing the right to roam in the British Isles, Scandinavia, and continental 
Europe). 
 87 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1823, 1825 (2009) (“[I]t is necessary to understand the impact of the weakened ex post protection 
on the ex ante protection of the owner against trespass. Setting compensation at market value 
effectively erases the power of the owner to determine the price for the use of her entitlement. 
Similarly, it annuls the owner’s immunity against forced transactions. Worse yet, it undermines 
the incentive for third parties to initiate negotiations with property owners.”). 
 88 The historical reason for this is that trespass was considered an offense against the public 
peace, and therefore relief was always granted as means of discouraging disruptive community 
influences. See WINFIELD ON TORT 323–25 (Rogers, W.V.H. ed., 1967). For a critique of this 
prioritization of plaintiffs, see Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, The Fault of Trespass, 65 U. TO-
RONTO L.J. 48, 97–98 (2015). 
 89 See Eric R. Claeys, The Right to Exclude in the Shadow of the Cathedral: A Response to 
Parchomovsky and Stein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 391, 404, 408 (2010) (contending that “option 
scholarship does not explain why trespass law strongly prefers injunctions when they can be en-
forced and propertized-compensation damages or disgorgement when they cannot”). 
 90 See, e.g., Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Common 
law principles . . . indicate that reasonable rental value is the appropriate remedy for trespass. 
Damage remedies for trespass are essentially compensatory and not punitive.”); RESTATEMENT 
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Entrances to the property’s core—the residence, the place of business, 
the cultivated area—are much more likely to generate harm than entrances 
to the outskirts. Trespass to a property’s outskirts will normally give rise to 
no meaningful harm and thus no meaningful damages awards. Consider 
again the example of the dog relieving itself across the property line: a main 
reason for the dearth of lawsuits pursuing such offenders is that such intru-
sions (unlike identical intrusions committed into the home) generate little to 
no harm. Such suits would entitle the owner to miniscule tort damages, and, 
consequently, owners who experience such trespasses to their property lack 
a legal incentive to actually enforce their formal rights.92 
Trespass law’s denial of a unitary vision of property—one that would 
treat identically an entrance to any part of the owner’s land—extends still 
further to cases where the intruder or intrusion remain on the property. When 
the trespasser is still situated on the owner’s land, devising a remedy should 
be straightforward: the remedy should simply be the entrant’s removal via an 
injunction. An injunction is indeed the traditional remedy in trespass cas-
es.93 Nevertheless, such an injunction is less likely when the entrant is lo-
cated on the property’s outskirts, rather than in its core. 
A permanent intrusion—for example, a structure or wall built on the 
land of another—should, under trespass law, always be removed.94 Yet courts 
have recognized the “improving trespasser” doctrine that renders this reme-
dy discretionary—particularly when the intrusion occurs on the property’s 
edges. Under the doctrine, an injunction will not be awarded if the trespass-
er’s expenditure in erecting the intruding structure was substantial, the in-
trusion minimal, and the encroachment innocent.95 All three elements are 
much likelier to be present when the intrusion is to the property’s outskirts, 
                                                                                                                           
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 931 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that courts predominantly use 
market-based rent as a benchmark for determining compensation for trespass). 
 91 See, e.g., Stockman v. Duke, 578 So. 2d 831, 832–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no 
difference in value of land before and after trespass and thus reducing damages awarded by trial 
court to one dollar); Brown v. Smith, 920 A.2d 18, 32 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (finding “nomi-
nal” damage award of $8,350 to trespass victim excessive and remanding to trial court to deter-
mine appropriate compensatory damages, if any). Punitive damages are an option, but they “are 
few and far between and consequently do very little to undermine the generality of market-value 
compensation.” Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 87, at 1836. 
 92 See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds, 342 P.2d 790, 795 (Or. 1959) (en banc) (“Inasmuch as it is 
not necessary to prove actual damage in trespass the magnitude of the intrusion ordinarily would 
not be of any consequence. But there is a point where the entry is so lacking in substance that the 
law will refuse to recognize it . . . .”); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 161 
(Wis. 1997) (describing the applicable thirty-dollar forfeiture as a “halfpenny”). 
 93 Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1723, 1732 (2004). 
 94 See Geragosian v. Union Realty, 193 N.E. 726, 728 (Mass. 1935) (“The general rule is that 
the owner of land is entitled to an injunction for the removal of trespassing structures”). 
 95 SINGER, supra note 18, at 43–44. 
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rather than within the property’s core. A permanent intrusion made to the 
core of the owner’s land is highly unlikely to meet the improving trespasser 
doctrine’s requirements: it is unlikely to be minimal or made in good faith.96 
Conversely, a structure intruding on the land’s edges is normally a part of a 
larger structure built on the trespasser’s own land—for example, a slight 
intrusion by the wall of the neighbor’s house resulting from a surveying 
mistake.97 The intrusion is thus often expensive to remove, causes little 
harm to the invaded owner, and is the product of innocent miscalculation. In 
addition, the encroached owner is less likely to immediately note such bor-
der intrusions, and courts are hostile to removal claims that are not brought 
promptly.98 The upshot is that, in practice, almost all cases in which courts 
rely on the improving trespasser doctrine to refuse the award of an injunction 
against an intruding structure involve intrusions to the property’s edges.99  
The doctrine of improving trespasser joins still other assorted doctrines 
that courts resort to when settling border disputes, doctrines that enable 
courts to avoid automatic orders of removal under trespass law. Acquies-
cence, estoppel, and dedication are all doctrines the operation of which 
leads to the owner losing the portion of his or her land located near the 
property’s borderon its edges.100 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (“Even where a remedy imposes a forced exchange on the property owner, the 
extent of the resulting hardship is largely a function of the owner's reasonable expectations regard-
ing the property.”). 
 97 See, e.g., Arnold v. Melani, 449 P.2d 800, 801, 806 (Wash. 1968) (per curiam) (holding 
that mandatory injunction for removal of an encroaching building onto neighbors’ land could be 
withheld where the intruding owner did not act in bad faith, the damage to adjoining owner’s land 
was minimal, moving of the structure would be impractical, and disparity in resulting hardships 
was enormous). Even the rarer still cases where a neighbor builds, in good faith, her entire struc-
ture on the owner’s land, are much likelier to occur close to the property boundary, rather than 
near the core of the owner’s land. See, e.g., Proctor v. Huntington, 238 P.3d 1117, 1118, 1123 
(Wash. 2010) (en banc) (holding that where neighbors unknowingly built garage entirely on por-
tion of land owned by adjoining owner, fair and just remedy was for intruding neighbors to pur-
chase land they encroached upon, rather than for the court to issue an injunction to require neigh-
bors to remove their improvements from owner’s land). 
 98 See Stewart E. Sterk, Strict Liability and Negligence in Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2129, 2154–56 (2012). 
 99 Id. at 2143–45; see, e.g., Myers v. Yingling, 279 S.W.3d 83, 84, 90 (Ark. 2008) (involving 
a landowner blocking neighbors’ only means of egress onto their property by erecting a gate on a 
private roadway that ran through edge of owner’s land); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 
592, 593, 596 (Colo. 1951) (en banc) (holding that where neighboring company constructed its 
building’s foundation and footings, which were seven feet below surface of ground, to intrude two 
to four inches onto owners’ property, a mandatory injunction for removal was unconscionable and 
that owners must thus be relegated to compensation in damages). For more on the improving tres-
passer doctrine’s practical effects, see Shoked, supra note 58, at 483–85. 
 100 See SINGER, supra note 18, at 170–72. 
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In both its criminal and tort law iterations, trespass thus flatly denies 
the unitary vision of property. The power of the protections from intrusion 
that it proffers the owner varies across the owner’s land. The neighbor’s dog 
relieving itself on the property line will not constitute a criminal act and is 
unlikely to generate civil liability; that dog doing the same in the residence 
will. A court will, in most cases, order removal of an intruder’s structure in 
the middle of the owner’s land;101 however, a neighbor’s structure intruding 
across the property line often will not result in such an order. The unitary 
view of property cannot account for this varied level of legal protection af-
forded to the right to exclude—under some theories, property’s “sine qua 
non”102—across different spaces within the owned property. In actuality, as 
opposed to theoretical commentary, trespass law distinguishes the proper-
ty’s edges from its core. 
2. Aerial Navigation 
Trespass law illustrates how, though formally embracing a unitary vi-
sion of property, the law in fact enacts a core-edges vision of property. In 
one element of trespass law—aerial trespass—the law abandons even the 
formal trappings of a unitary vision. For over seventy years now, the Amer-
ican legal regime for managing the skies has explicitly been grounded in 
what this Article terms an edges approach. 
As most law students learn early in a property course, the advent of 
aviation in the early twentieth-century posed a challenge to prevailing prop-
erty concepts. Under the common law, a private land owner’s right extends 
not only to the surface, but rather also into the air above “all the way to 
Heaven.” The rule, known by its Latin phrasing as the “ad coelum doc-
trine,” implies that a plane flying above a private owner’s land is entering 
that owner’s private property. The plane is thus committing a trespass—just 
as if it were a car driving through the owner’s house.103 
                                                                                                                           
 101 But see Sommerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805, 806, 815 (W.Va. 1969) (holding that 
where an intruding neighbor built a structure entirely on land owned by the plaintiff owner, the 
owner must either compensate the intruding neighbor for the increase in the fair market value of 
the property or the intruding neighbor must purchase the land under which the structure was built 
from the owner). 
 102 Merrill, supra note 46, at 730. 
 103 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18. The complete formulation of the 
doctrine is as follows: 
Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as 
downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, is the maxim of the law, 
upwards; therefore no man may erect any building, or the like, to overhang another's 
land: and, downwards, whatever is in a direct line between the surface of any land, 
and the center of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every day's ex-
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This equivalence, mandated by the ad coelum doctrine, was neverthe-
less explicitly rejected in the seminal U.S Supreme Court case of United 
States v. Causby in 1946. Dismissing “that doctrine” as having “no place in 
the modern world,”104 Justice Douglas emphasized that legal treatment must 
vary in accordance with the specific spot within the private owner’s domain 
into which the airplane (or any other person or object) intrudes. The Court 
was considering Congress’s authorization of interstate flights within “navi-
gable airspace” (space situated at or above minimum safe altitudes of 
flight),105 defined by regulators to include most airspace over five hundred 
feet above the ground. The federal government had thereby extracted a right 
of way—an easement—from private owners, allowing planes to pass 
through the owners’ properties above the five-hundred-feet line.106 Yet the 
Court ruled that this extraction did not amount to an intrusion requiring the 
payment of compensation. A plane’s entrance into the owner’s land is ac-
tionable only if it occurs elsewhere in the property—closer to the ground. 
Specifically, the Court held that the owner enjoyed protected rights solely in 
the “immediate reaches of the [land’s] enveloping atmosphere.”107 The 
Court focused on low flights that could, as in the case at hand, disturb the 
owner in the normal use of their home or farm: 
[T]he airspace is a public highway. Yet . . . [t]he superadjacent 
airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous 
invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We 
think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a 
                                                                                                                           
perience in the mining countries. So that the word ‘land’ includes not only the face 
of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it. And therefore if a man grants all his 
lands, he grants thereby all his mines of metal and other fossils, his woods, his wa-
ters, and his houses, as well as his fields and meadows. 
Id. 
 104 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). In Causby, the plaintiff-landowners 
owned a chicken farm that was located near an airport regularly used by the military during World 
War II. Due to the proximity of the airport and the setup of the farm’s structures, military planes 
often passed at only eighty-three feet above the surface of the owners’ property; the noise caused 
the death of over 150 of the owners’ chickens, eventually forcing the owners to give up their 
chicken business. The owners, therefore, claimed that the sustained and close overhead plane 
travel constituted an unconstitutional taking. Id. at 258–59. 
 105 Id. at 258, 263; see 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2018) (“‘Navigable air space’ means air-
space above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations under this subpart and sub-
part III of this part.”). 
 106 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 261–64, 267. 
 107 Id. at 264. 
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claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same category as in-
vasions of the surface.108 
The Causby decision created a key distinction between aerial invasions 
into the owner’s property occurring at a high altitude above the surface—
which would not count as acts of trespass—and invasions occurring close to 
the surface—which could. The Court refrained from neatly drawing that 
line of demarcation defining the area in which the owner’s rights were more 
fully protected. The concept on which the Court relied to describe the ar-
ea—the concept of the house’s “immediate reaches”—was left intentionally 
fuzzy.109 The line has been made hazier still in American law, as federal 
regulations now clarify that even the five-hundred-feet line is not fixed 
across different properties, and may move up or down in accordance with 
the use of the land below.110 
This legal regime announced in Causby is an uncontested element of 
American property law.111 Yet it starkly contradicts the unitary notion of 
private property on which, as Part I shows, commentators still rely.112 That 
theoretical notion is perfectly embedded in the old ad coelum doctrine. Af-
ter all, that doctrine is premised on the idea that the owner’s rights are uni-
tary and consistent across space from the hells below the surface to the 
heavens above.113 The doctrine as announced in Causby is that notion’s 
complete negation.114 Justice Douglas’s opinion stated, in no uncertain 
terms, that the owner’s private property is protected from invasions to dras-
tically varying degrees based on the closeness of the invaded private space 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. at 264–65. 
 109 See ALISSA DOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42940, INTE-
GRATION OF DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 8 (Apr. 4, 2013), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42940.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCE2-HMZY] (explaining that Caus-
by “declined to draw a clear line”). 
 110 Over “congested areas,” the line is at “an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle 
within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.” 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b) (2010). Over water 
or in “sparsely populated areas,” aircraft can fly less than 500 feet above the ground so long as 
they are not “operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.” See id. 
§ 91.119(c). Within six miles of some airports, the line may commence at less than 500 feet above 
ground to provide for takeoffs and landings. See id. § 77.17. 
 111 See STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? 259–60 (2008) (reporting that after Causby, 
“reported cases raising the issue [of aerial trespass] became less common” and that “the aerial 
trespass debate largely fizzled out”). 
 112 Some of the unitary view’s strongest adherents thus deem the decision “rhetorical excess.” 
E.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 296 (3rd 
ed. 2017). 
 113 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18 (defining the ad coelum doctrine). 
 114 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 266; see also Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th 
Cir. 1936) (“[W]e reject that doctrine [ad coelum]. We think it is not the law, and that it never was 
the law.”). 
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to some (loosely defined) core place within the owner’s property. The far-
ther an area is from that core, the stronger the public rights (here, the right 
for aerial navigation) in it. 
3. Police Searches 
The doctrine respecting private property’s protection from aerial navi-
gation generates little controversy these days—outside the emerging context 
of drones, to which we will return later in this Article.115 The doctrine re-
garding private property’s protection from police searches, in contrast, gen-
erates abundant litigation.116 Still, all such litigation proceeds based on a 
baseline that—very much like the Causby rule for aerial navigation—
wholeheartedly denies the unitary, boundary-focused, notion of private 
property. 
The Constitution’s Fourth Amendment requires that the police obtain a 
warrant before conducting a search of private property.117 That constitution-
al decree generates a key question: what government intrusions into the pri-
vate realm count as searches (and hence necessitate a warrant)? The history 
of the prohibition against government searches, and the supposed property 
law principles on which it relied, seemed to imply that any police intrusion 
onto an owner’s property requires a warrant.118 Hence, in one of the earliest 
cases where the Supreme Court expounded on the Fourth Amendment, Jus-
tice Bradley, reviewing the Amendment’s history, concluded: 
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of 
constitutional liberty and security. They reach further than the 
concrete form of the case . . . [because] they apply to all invasions 
on the part of the government and its employes [sic] of the sancti-
ty of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking 
of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes 
the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See infra notes 254–280 and accompanying text. 
 116 For example, a leading casebook dedicates close to eighty pages to the question of what 
counts as a search. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRIN-
CIPLES, POLICIES, AND PERSPECTIVES 95–173 (6th ed. 2017). 
 117 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 118 See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that any warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest is unreasonable and unconstitution-
al under the Fourth Amendment). 
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. . . it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and con-
stitutes the essence of [the legal protection].119 
This majestic proclamation, respecting property’s consistent and un-
conditional impenetrability, is often cited.120 But the Court has never blind-
ly accepted claims that endeavor to rely on the unitary reading of property 
protection embodied in this famous statement.121 In 1924, in Hester v. Unit-
ed States, which presented the first instance in which an owner attempted to 
base a challenge to a police search on the proclamation’s literal meaning, 
the Court balked and hastened to clarify that not all intrusions required a 
warrant. In a terse opinion, Justice Holmes dismissed the claim that, in or-
der to examine and obtain a jug containing moonshine whiskey located on 
private land but outside the house, the police required a warrant. Justice 
Holmes simply noted that “[t]he distinction between [open fields] and the 
house is as old as the common law.”122 Although an intrusion into the home 
required a warrant, an intrusion into “open fields”—where the jug was 
found—did not.123 
This open fields doctrine (covering spaces that need neither be “open” 
nor “fields”)124 has been repeatedly reaffirmed.125 To isolate the privately-
owned spaces where, unlike in those open fields, police intrusions are regu-
lated, the Court developed the concept of “curtilage.”126 The curtilage is 
“the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home.”127 The 
government’s entrance into that specific area within the owner’s land, un-
like its entrance into the other area within the owner’s land—the open 
fields—amounts to an intrusion requiring a warrant. Although the distinc-
tion between curtilage and open fields might appear clear, the Court has 
refused to provide a definitive denotation of the dividing-line. Instead, it has 
urged reliance on a multi-factor test: the area’s proximity to the home, its 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 120 Morgan Cloud, Judicial Review and the Exclusionary Rule, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 841 
(1999) (describing it as “a frequently quoted passage”). 
 121 See Matthew B. Kugler & Thomas H. Rousse, The Privacy Hierarchy: Trade Secret and 
Fourth Amendment Expectations, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (reviewing the law’s 
development). 
 122 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
 123 See id. 
 124 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 n.11 (1984). 
 125 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.4(a) (5th ed. 2013). 
 126 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (“Neither the cases we have cited 
nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have 
been violated . . . unless there has been . . . an actual physical invasion of [the defendant’s] house 
‘or curtilage’. . . .”). 
 127 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
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inclusion within an enclosure, steps taken to protect the area from public 
view, and its use by residents.128 
This Fourth Amendment jurisprudence respecting searches explicitly 
relies, as Justice Scalia stressed, on a “traditional property-based under-
standing.”129 Yet it rebuts the traditional theories of property described in 
Part I. For those unitary theories, there can be no difference between the 
owner’s rights on one part of her land and her rights on another part of the 
land. They view property as a unitary spatial category. For American law, 
however, the difference between different portions of the landopen fields 
versus curtilageis the key component of the doctrine regulating the gov-
ernment’s ability to enter an owner’s land. In the open fields portion of the 
private owner’s land, even when the owner places “No Trespassing” signs 
and installs a locked gate at the entrance, the government’s entry would not 
count as an intrusion.130 In the curtilage, on the other hand, even in the ab-
sence of any of these precautions, the police’s entrance will amount to an 
intrusion.131 The home forms the “core” of that latter, protected, area,132 and 
certain areas immediately adjacent to the home enjoy some, though perhaps 
not identical,133 protections. The definition of those areas—collectively 
forming the home’s curtilage—is fluid and dependent on the land’s location, 
conditions, and use. As commentators conclude, the end result is that, for 
purposes of protections from police searches, some trespasses count more 
                                                                                                                           
 128 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
 129 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013). 
 130 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173, 180–81 (rejecting a case-by-case approach because, “[u]nder 
this approach, police officers would have to guess before every search whether landowners had 
erected fences sufficiently high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located contra-
band in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a right of privacy”). 
 131 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961). The Court in Silverman 
stated: 
Here, by contrast, the officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by 
usurping part of the petitioners' house or office—a heating system which was an in-
tegral part of the premises occupied by the petitioners, a usurpation that was effected 
without their knowledge and without their consent. In these circumstances we need 
not pause to consider whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local 
property law relating to party walls. . . . This Court has never held that a federal of-
ficer may without warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man's of-
fice or home, there secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent 
criminal trial what was seen or heard. 
Id. 
 132 See id. at 511. 
 133 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (holding that police officers need not 
avert their eyes, and therefore, observable elements of the curtilage may be less protected than the 
home). 
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than others.134 Trespasses to the home—the core—are not identical to tres-
passes to the property’s edges, which are not so “intimately linked to” the 
core, “both physically and psychologically.”135 
B. The Appeal of the Edges Concept of Property 
Why does the law, through its trespass laws, protect some areas of pri-
vately-owned land more than others? Why is the government allowed to 
force an owner to permit airplanes on her property at certain altitudes as 
opposed to others? Why does the police need a warrant only when entering 
specific parts of the owner’s land? Why, in other words, despite the sup-
posed unitary nature of property that the theories reviewed in Part I ad-
vance, does the law draw a distinction between different areas of the owned 
land—between a core, meriting stronger protections from outsiders, and 
edges in which those same outsiders enjoy some access rights? 
In this Section, we review the reasons why the law denies the unitary 
property theory. We thereby present the rationale undergirding the law’s 
edges property theory.136 We identify three groups of such reasons: norma-
tive, empirical, and administrative. The normative reason relates to the val-
ues that the legal recognition of property seeks to promote.137 The empirical 
reason relates to individuals’ attitude towards, and reliance on, their proper-
ty holdings.138 Finally, the administrative reason relates to the ease of prop-
erty rights’ legal administration.139 
1. The Normative Basis for the Edges Concept 
The law recognizes property rights in order to promote certain norma-
tive values. The two values normally associated with property and its con-
comitant right to exclude are efficient development of land and privacy.140 
Without a private property right to land, permitting the owner to exclude all 
others, individuals will have little incentive to develop land because they 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Kugler & Rousse, supra note 121, at 54. 
 135 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
 136 See infra notes 140–187 and accompanying text. 
 137 See infra notes 140–150 and accompanying text. 
 138 See infra notes 151–174 and accompanying text. 
 139 See infra notes 175–187 and accompanying text. 
 140 See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (discussing privacy as a goal of en-
forcing property rights); Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 
509, 514–18 (1996) (discussing property rights’ goals in general and in the context of cyberspace); 
Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings 
Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 267 (1996) (discussing efficient economic develop-
ment of private and public resources as a goal of enforcing property rights). 
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will fear that others will be able to reap the fruits of any development.141 
Similarly, by establishing property rights from which others can be kept out, 
the law bestows on individuals a realm of autonomy where they can lead 
their lives as they see fit.142 The law defines and then protects property 
rights in accordance with their ability to serve these two values. As we will 
now demonstrate, protection of the property’s core is much more vital for 
the advancement of efficient development and privacy than the protection 
of its edges—as realized by the lawmakers designing the laws of trespass, 
aerial navigation, and police searches. 
The need to distinguish core from edges when considering property’s 
function in facilitating efficient land development is the normative ground-
ing of the aerial navigation doctrine. In Causby, the Court insisted on the 
owner’s strong protection from public intrusions into her realm—but only 
as far as her structures and their immediate reaches were concerned. The 
reason, Justice Douglas explained, is that there, and only there, control is 
necessary for an owner to be able to develop her land—development that is 
socially beneficial.143 The farther the contested airspace is located from the 
property’s core, the private owner’s ability to develop it herselfand thus, 
to chart the best economic course for itdecreases. At some physical point, 
as the space draws closer to the public realm or to the property of others, the 
public becomes a better arbiter of the space’s best uses. Hence, high alti-
tudes are designated a “public highway.”144 An edges solution accommo-
dates a reality whereby a public use of the far aerial reaches of the owner’s 
property should be more efficient than any decision the owner herself 
makes respecting its use. Under that solution the owner remains the formal 
owner of that high-altitude space (and hence, the public may not erect float-
ing structures there) but he or she is subject to a public easement (and hence 
cannot block travel there). 
Promotion of the normative value of privacy explains the use of the 
concept of “curtilage” in the police search cases. The area within the own-
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968), http://
pages.mtu.edu/~asmayer/rural_sustain/governance/Hardin%201968.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TBP-
CWWU]. 
 142 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 57 (1993) (“The liberty ra-
tionale can be bent into a privacy rationale by considering the limitations on liberty set by the 
presence and activities of other people. The argument would be that people do not have sufficient 
liberty unless they have some realm shut off from the interference of others.”). 
 143 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264 (“[I]t is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoy-
ment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping at-
mosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences 
could not be run.”). 
 144 Id. at 261, 264. 
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er’s land that ought to be protected from warrantless police searches—the 
curtilage—was characterized by the Court as “the area to which extends the 
intimate activity associated with ‘the sanctity of a man’s home and the pri-
vacies of life.’”145 Other areas, those covered by the open fields doctrine, 
conversely, “do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the 
[Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or 
surveillance.”146 That latter area lies in between the core of the owner’s pri-
vate space and the public space (the street, for example). Due to this fact, 
the owner does not, and often simply cannot, engage there in intimate activ-
ities;147 the proximity to the public space effectively precludes that op-
tion.148 The public interest in promoting effective policing (necessary for 
public safety) hence trumps the private interest in privacy in those areas, an 
interest which could hardly be meaningfully served there to begin with. For 
privacy purposes, the area is, quite literally, an edges area, and the law cre-
ates an edges regime for it: the owner controls the land, but the police are 
legally allowed to enter—even without the owner’s permission or a warrant. 
The aerial navigation doctrine and the police searches doctrine share a 
normative intuition. Property rights are set in order to promote certain social 
values: efficient land use and privacy. There is no reason to assume that a 
legal regime that empowers a private owner would serve these values in an 
identical fashion and to an equal extent throughout the land the owner 
holds.149 Quite the opposite, common sense dictates that, in most circum-
stances, as the relevant privately-owned space draws closer to the public 
area, the capacity of the owner’s control over it to promote efficient deci-
sion-making or that owner’s privacy proportionally decreases.150 The in-
sights embodied in the aerial navigation and police search cases are thus not 
limited to those specific contexts; they provide the normative grounds for the 
law’s general rejection of the unitary property approach. They explain the 
law’s embrace of the edges approach—an approach that affords the owner 
decreased rights of control over her property’s edges. 
                                                                                                                           
 145 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
 146 Id. at 179. 
 147 Id.; see RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 314 n.8 (1981) (noting that “the 
invasion of a property interest is not a sufficient condition to find an invasion of privacy”). 
 148 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 
508–09 (2007) (explaining that protection is only granted “when the odds are very high that others 
will not successfully pry into [the owner’s] affairs”). 
 149 Similarly, commentators note that some properties should enjoy more protection than 
others and that the determination should hinge on the properties’ respective natures—and perhaps 
even their owners’ identities. E.g., Underkuffler, supra note 76, at 375. 
 150 See Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 
413, 422–23 (2017) (criticizing a court for counter-intuitively assuming that owners had a privacy 
interest in 160 acres of empty, snow-covered land). 
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2. The Empirical Basis for the Edges Concept 
The protection of property rights, perhaps more so than other elements 
of private law, draws not only on normative values, but also on social be-
liefs and expectations.151 From Blackstone’s oft-repeated catchphrase on the 
popular cachet of the right of property,152 to more recent scholarly explora-
tions, commentators have long noted how deeply ingrained in laypeople’s 
minds the concept of private property is.153 The law often follows these ex-
pectations respecting property protections so as not to fall out of line with 
public perceptions—an eventuality undesirable for an array of reasons.154 
As we will explain now, these public expectations about property that in-
form the law do not align with a unitary property view. Although laypeople 
generally believe in the strength of their and their neighbors’ property 
rights, they do not necessarily believe that all privately-owned spaces enjoy 
the same strong protections.155 
The reason that the examples provided in this Article’s Introduction 
probably strike most readers as intuitive is that they are in line with the av-
erage person’s expectations. We all tend to assume that an owner has greater 
obligations to the public with respect to a tree on his or her property if that 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849, 1850–51 (2007) (“Rules making nearness and physical control the criteria for posses-
sion have a psychological basis, and the convention of respecting possession stems from people’s 
mutual expectations that they will respect the right to control these things.”). 
 152 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (“[N]othing which so generally strikes 
the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property.”). 
 153 E.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 211 
(2000). 
 154 Many property law doctrines give voice to individuals’ varying expectations respecting 
owners’ powers. One example of such varying expectations is custom. See, e.g., Oregon ex rel. 
Thompson v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673–75 (Or. 1969) (stating that long-standing public use of 
beaches established a custom that limited owners’ rights). Additionally, some states presume that 
use of land of another is permissive. See Jones v. Cullen, No. CX95601705, 1998 WL 811558, at 
*5 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1998) (explaining that owners often allow others to cross over as a 
“neighborly gesture” and thus, a use should be considered permitted and not giving rise to a pre-
scriptive easement). Another expectations-grounded rule involves the acquisition of prescriptive 
rights by or from the public. See Elmer v. Rodgers, 214 A.2d 750, 752 (N.H. 1965) (explaining 
that “[t]he stabilization of long continued property uses” can serve as justification for a public 
prescriptive easement). Finally, a key element in the regulatory takings’ test further highlights 
social expectations molding of owners’ property rights. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (setting “distinct investment-backed expectations” as one of the 
three factors determining whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred). 
 155 For a general survey of the psychological literature leading to the conclusion that there is 
no reason to assume that people’s feelings respecting property’s protection are automatically de-
rived from the fact of ownership alone, across all circumstances, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, 
What Behavioral Studies Can Teach Jurists About Possession and Vice Versa, in LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS OF POSSESSION 128, 129–31 (Yun-Chien Chang ed., 2015). 
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tree is close to the public sidewalk; similarly, we all are probably more out-
raged when the neighbor’s dog relieves itself on the house’s front-door than 
when it does so on the yard’s hedges. 
The law in the three doctrinal fields discussed above is clearly attuned 
to these common human reactions. The definition that the law employs for 
the crime of trespass provides a stark illustration. The crime is recognized 
whenever the trespasser enters the property’s core—say, the residence—
without permission.156 But if the entry is to the property’s outskirts, in some 
states liability arises only if the entrant was explicitly told to stay out.157 
The law assumes that owners permit entry to their land’s outskirts—or that 
community members tend to believe that such permission is extended—
while entry to the core is presumed to be, as a matter of common under-
standings, prohibited.158 
Similarly, in trespass tort claims, courts routinely refuse to order puni-
tive damages for entrances to the property’s outskirts. They only award 
compensatory damages for actual harm caused by the trespass, which, as 
previously noted, normally amount in these instances to zero.159 Courts 
conceive such entrances as in line with common expectations respecting 
areas into which the public is invited and refuse to deem them worthy of 
harsh legal sanctions such as punitive damages.160 This attitude was perhaps 
particularly pronounced in the early aerial navigation cases. Even before the 
Supreme Court redefined the ad coelum doctrine in Causby, courts largely 
refused to abide by the doctrine, suspecting that claimants were exploiting the 
gap between black-letter law and common-sense expectations.161 
The police search cases are often explicitly couched in similar assertions 
about people’s expectations.162 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, the 
extension of protection against warrantless searches to the house’s curtilage, 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 157 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 158 See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES § 5:3 (2016 
Rev.) (“Th[e] presumption of adverse use does not apply, however, when an easement is claimed 
over vacant and unenclosed land.”). 
 159 See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 160 See Thomas v. Harrah’s Vicksburg Corp., 734 So. 2d 312, 321 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that plaintiff must prove defendant “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which 
evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual 
fraud” to receive punitive damages); Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 681 N.Y.S.2d 
511, 512 (App. Div. 1998) (finding no punitive damages available when reporters gain entrance 
fraudulently because entry was not motivated by malice). 
 161 BANNER, supra note 111, at 259–60. 
 162 See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circu-
larity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1749 (2017) (discussing Justice Harlan’s opinion in Katz v. Unit-
ed States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which created a “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy” test). 
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but not to the open fields, was connected to owners’ expectations.163 Owners 
expect privacy in their homes and in those homes’ immediate surroundings, 
but generally not outside of those surroundings.164 The multi-factor test that 
the Court developed through its jurisprudence to assess whether an area is 
part of the protected curtilage was explicitly designed to determine how far 
the reasonable expectation of privacy extends outside the home.165 In all 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, reasonable expectations are the guiding-
light.166 Thus, for example, in 1988, in California v. Greenwood, the Court 
held that the police were allowed to sift through trash bags left in front of 
the house because the owner could not expect privacy in items he discarded; 
even if the specific owner held a subjective expectation of such privacy, the 
Court found that society did not share such an expectation of privacy in 
one’s curbside trash.167 
In these and other cases, courts base their decisions on what they deem 
to be individuals’ expectations—holding that individuals do not expect full 
protection of private entitlements outside of the property’s spatial core.168 
Of course, courts often resort to untested assumptions in such cases. Re-
cently, however, scholars have begun to empirically appraise these assump-
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doc-
trine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 130 (2002) (“[T]he Court in Oliver 
reasoned against the privacy of the open field by appealing to social norms about trespass.”). 
 164 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14 (holding, where police officers flew in a private airplane 
over property owner’s land and observed marijuana plants growing in property owner’s backyard, 
that an “expectation that [the owner’s] garden was protected from such observation is unreasona-
ble and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor”). 
 165 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. The Court in Dunn stated: 
Drawing upon the Court’s own cases and the cumulative experience of the lower 
courts that have grappled with the task of defining the extent of a home's curtilage, 
we believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to 
four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether 
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses 
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from 
observation by people passing by. 
Id. 
 166 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that police conduct 
amounts to a search when “a person [exhibits] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and 
. . . [when] the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”). 
 167 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (“The warrantless search and seizure 
of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the Greenwood house would violate the Fourth 
Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage 
that society accepts as objectively reasonable.”). 
 168 See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12 (surmising that the curtilage/fields distinction will 
be “easily understood from our daily experience”). 
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tions.169 Psychological experiments and surveys have, by and large, corrob-
orated the jurisprudence’s assumptions: individuals have varying privacy 
expectations across the different portions of their property. One recent study 
finds that individuals’ expectations respecting privacy—specifically, the 
protection from government and corporate surveillance—is not identical 
throughout their holdings.170 Another experiment found that the intensity of 
individuals’ objections to governmental taking of property similarly de-
pends on the nature of the property taken and the use to which it is put.171 
An additional example is a research of gardening practices in Vancouver 
finding that individuals’ perceptions of private property’s boundaries are 
complex, inter-subjective, and ambiguous.172 
Property rights are set to protect reasonable expectations.173 Those ex-
pectations do, inarguably, assign a role to the boundary between private and 
public property. Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that those expecta-
tions—individuals’ expectations respecting the degree of protection afforded 
to their holdings—are fully binary. Individuals simply do not expect to enjoy 
full protections everywhere on the private side of a property boundary, and 
they do not expect to enjoy no protections whatsoever throughout the public 
side.174 Courts never assumed that individuals hold such extreme expecta-
tions—and hence, in different fields, courts refused to rely on the unitary 
                                                                                                                           
 169 Examples for these new works on property and psychology include: Daphna Lewinsohn-
Zamir, Behavioral Law and Economics of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAV-
IORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 377, 377 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (critically 
surveying the behavioral law and economics literature on property law, and discussing several 
areas in which behavioral analysis has made an impact on property law, such as in the characteri-
zation of property as either a thing or a bundle of sticks, and gaps in current literature that warrant 
further de-biasing and research); Paul Babie et al., The Idea of Property: An Introductory Empiri-
cal Assessment, 40 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 797, 797 (2018) (exploring the development of property 
law and how it became an omnipresent force at controlling things and people); Janice Nadler, The 
Social Psychology of Property, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 367, 368 (2018) (examining “social 
and moral influences on beliefs about property and the consequences of these beliefs for the legal 
regulation of property”). 
 170 See Kugler & Rousse, supra note 121, at 8 (finding that the data suggests that people have 
a permitted “search hierarchy” in their private property and that “people want and expect the gov-
ernment to have more freedom to surveil than commercial parties”). 
 171 Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Proper-
ty Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
713, 715–16 (2008). 
 172 See generally Nicholas Blomley, Un-real Estate: Proprietary Space and Public Garden-
ing, 36 ANTIPODE 614 (2004) (showing the complexity of the defensible notion of property in a 
neo-liberal world through the example of efforts to enlist public participation in a gardening pro-
ject, or greenway). 
 173 SINGER, supra note 18, at 20. 
 174 The insight is not dissimilar to the hardly-contested moral assumption that a property own-
er carries duties in accordance with what he or she decides to do with that property. See Laura S. 
Underkuffler, A Moral Theory of Property, 2 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 301, 311 (2015). 
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property theory. The empirical backing for the law’s assumptions in this re-
spect is mounting, further boosting the edges property theory. 
3. The Administrative Basis for the Edges Concept 
At the end of the day, property law rules, like all legal rules, are tools 
for settling social disputes. The disputes with which property law is con-
cerned are particularly endemic because almost all social interactions occur 
against the background of some asset.175 Consequently, property law poten-
tially opens the door for courts to actively regulate all individual and market 
activities. In designing property rules, therefore, normative values and so-
cial perceptions, like those reviewed in the two preceding sections, cannot 
be the only factors that lawmakers consider. The administrative costs that 
the rules generate and courts’ deftness at applying those rules are also de-
terminative.176 Despite common wisdom, these too necessitate the applica-
tion of the edges theory.177 
Courts and scholars often assume that clear-cut rules economize on 
administrative costs and, by bracketing the discretion of lay, capricious 
judges, enable market participants to negotiate welfare-enhancing bar-
gains.178 This assumption advocates reliance on an unequivocal boundary 
between private and public, and on a legal regime instituting an uncompli-
cated and constant definition of property rights. Such an approach should 
serve the goals of administrative economy.179 
At least, that is the theory; the reality, however, is quite different.180 
Both the aerial navigation and the police searches cases nicely illustrate the 
fact that, in actuality, the boundary-focused unitary property approach 
breeds impossible administrative challenges—and is therefore disfavored. 
A unitary boundary-focused property theory, because it insists on abso-
lute protections for private ownership throughout land and space, thrusts al-
most all activitiesboth large and smallinto court. Insouciantly dismissing 
the ad coelum doctrine in Causby, Justice Douglas explained that the unitary, 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See Underkuffler, supra note 65, at 2031. 
 176 See JOSEPH SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICES, AND PRACTICES 401–03 
(7th ed. 2017). 
 177 See Smith, supra note 47, at 2066 (discussing the necessary role of system in property 
law). 
 178 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1685, 1687–88, 1708, 1729, 1748 (1976). 
 179 See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25 (1959) 
(“One of the purposes of the legal system is to establish that clear delimitation of rights on the 
basis of which the transfer and recombination of rights can take place through the market.”) 
 180 For further examples showing that, in fact, it is often costly to ascertain property rights 
based solely on supposedly easily administrable boundaries, see Sterk, supra note 98, at 2133–38. 
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boundary-based rule it dictates “would subject the operator [of every trans-
continental flight] to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the 
idea.”181 Acutely aware of these administrative risks, Justice Black, in his dis-
sent, would have gone further to facilitate aviation, by denying landowners 
compensation even for low altitude flights. Any recourse to unitary, bounda-
ry-based concepts will, he reckoned, force courtswhich do not possess the 
requisite “techniques or the personnel”to intrude on Congress’s efforts to 
make legislative adjustments to accommodate a new technology’s growth.182 
A similar concern with the administrative costs of heightened judicial 
interference, as necessitated by the rigid unitary property conception, ani-
mates some of the police searches jurisprudence. The open fields doctrine is 
designed specifically to be easily administrable by law enforcement and to 
reduce the need for judicial involvement.183 It is premised on the notion that 
it is difficult to completely seal off open spaces from public view.184 Courts 
find it wasteful to insist on judicial regulation when the individual owner, 
by leaving a space open to external observers, herself has assumed the risk 
of surveillance.185  
The same idea forms the backbone of trespass jurisprudence—even if 
courts are often not as explicit in discussing it there as they are in the aerial 
navigation and police search cases. Trespass’s actual, as opposed to formal, 
legal doctrine concludes that the right to exclude is vital, but providing 
owners with an incentive to litigate every minimal intrusion into their 
land—say, the dog relieving itself—would be senseless.186 
The unitary property view, in its reliance on a clearly defined boundary 
and a binary distinction between the owner’s space and others’ space, is 
                                                                                                                           
 181 Causby, 328 U.S. at 261. 
 182 Id. at 274–75. 
 183 See Colb, supra note 163, at 124–25 (noting that because it “is normal for passersby, in-
cluding police officers, to look at us momentarily[,] . . . . [r]equiring police to look away when 
everyone else may observe would accordingly add little to our privacy”; therefore, “the Court has 
defined a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ by reference to the privacy that one might legiti-
mately expect to have from other private actors, independent of any state surveillance”). 
 184 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181 (“Nor would a case-by-case approach provide a workable 
accommodation . . . . Under this approach, police officers would have to guess before every search 
whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted a sufficient number of warning 
signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a right of privacy.”). 
 185 See United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding no expectation of 
privacy where “defendants conducted illegal activities in plain view of a bedroom window facing 
into the side yard, a common area accessible to the other tenants in the multi-family apartment 
building”); United States v. York, 895 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that “occupants 
who leave window curtains or blinds open expose themselves to the public’s scrutiny” and that 
“police may look into that opening from any point in a public thoroughfare or sidewalk without 
engaging in a fourth amendment search”). 
 186 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 112, at 9. 
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trumpeted as administratively optimal. In practice, however, it often adds up 
to a form of boundary fetishism requiring endless and constant judicial po-
licing.187 Therefore, in many contexts, courts refuse to abide by the unitary 
view. Instead, they opt for pragmatism: the edges theory of property, which 
does not require—or even permit—litigation over each and every intrusion 
into private space. The edges view embodies a practical approach distin-
guishing intrusions that merit heightened judicial attention—intrusions into 
private property’s core—from those that do not—intrusions into private 
property’s edges. 
C. Summary: The Law’s Edges Concept of Property 
As we established in Part I, the unitary vision of property appears to 
reign among scholars of different theoretical persuasions.188 Nevertheless, 
the law seems—and has always seemed—to abhor this view. The doctrines 
that perform the most vital functions of property, enabling the owner to ex-
clude others and protecting her from the government, clearly deny the uni-
tary vision. They alter the level of protection bestowed on the owner’s in-
terest in accordance with the spot on the land wherein protection is sought. 
The owner has a lessened power to exclude from the land and from the air 
above it, and weaker protection from the police, in areas lying at her proper-
ty’s edges. 
There are good reasons for the law’s choice to adopt this edges ap-
proach rather than a unitary property approach. Some areas of the owned 
asset serve the goals of efficient development and individual privacy better 
than others. Individuals’ expectations regarding their, and their fellow own-
ers’, rights are not identical throughout the owned land. The administrative 
costs that the legal system must expend to regulate property relationships 
might grow unfathomable if disputes in the asset’s outskirts were regulated 
as forcibly as those occurring at its core. Courts and other lawmakers nor-
mally act on these insights. In doing so, they necessarily embrace an edges 
theory of property. 
III. APPLICATIONS OF THE EDGES CONCEPT: SOLUTIONS FOR  
UNSETTLED AREAS OF PROPERTY LAW 
Part II showed that, in general, the law does not follow a unitary prop-
erty conception, but rather prefers—for principled reasons—an edges idea. 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See Sterk, supra note 98, at 2133 (noting that when a potential user makes unsuccessful 
attempts to determine a property boundary, strict liability regimes require the user to compensate 
the owner even when the user did not actually derive any benefit from the use). 
 188 See supra notes 30–67 and accompanying text. 
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Still, the ubiquity of the unitary property concept of property rights—as 
seen in Part I—exhorts an influence on the law. There are exceptional cases 
in which courts resort to such simplistic, unitary ideas. Such rulings—
where, for example, a court insists on issuing increased punitive damages 
for a trespass into the edges of a property—may get much traction among 
observers.189 Yet such cases are almost universally criticized, even by ad-
herents of unitary, indeed essentialist, property theories,190 and are rarely 
followed by later courts.191 Because such rulings are unrepresentative outli-
ers, their importance to actual law is rather limited.192 
Much more impactful—albeit in a harmful way—are lawmakers’ turns 
to the unitary theory, not in individual, exceptional cases, but when devising 
the general regime for addressing certain categories of problems in property 
law. Particularly as new phenomena or technologies appear on the edges of 
property, judges, legislators, and regulators are prone to fall back on the 
simplistic, boundary-based understanding of property rights. 
 Property law, more than other legal fields, struggles mightily to ac-
commodate change.193 Because property law is defined as the protection of 
existing entitlements and is thus firmly attached to notions of stability, 
lawmakers often stumble when confronted with a real-world change that 
questions existing property practices.194 In attempting to address the legal 
challenges presented by such new occurrences, lawmakers sometimes heed-
lessly fall back on a unitary concept of private property. Often, this practice 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997) (holding 
where, despite landowners’ refusal to grant permission, company plowed path through owners’ 
snow-covered field to deliver mobile home to third party via that path, that punitive damages may 
also be awarded by a jury when nominal damages are also awarded for intentional trespass to 
land). The Jacque case is a casebook staple in a law school course on property. See, e.g., MERRILL 
& SMITH, supra note 112, at 1; SINGER ET AL., supra note 176, at 38. 
 190 See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 150, at 423 (“[T]he court’s justification for this holding was 
less than satisfying.”); Katz, supra note 82, at 303 (contending that “Jacque was most likely 
wrongly decided”). 
 191 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 195(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“A traveler on a 
public highway who reasonably believes that such highway is impassable, is privileged, when he 
reasonably believes it to be necessary in order to continue his journey, to enter, to a reasonable 
extent and in a reasonable manner, upon neighboring land in the possession of another . . . .”). The 
cases upon which the Restatement relies are “very much like the Jacque case on their facts, even 
to the point of finding an obstruction in snowdrifts.” John Makdisi, Uncaring Justice: Why Jacque 
v. Steenberg Homes Was Wrongly Decided, 51 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 111, 126 (2012). 
 192 Another example is the Loretto decision, discussed in the Introduction. See supra notes 
13–18 and accompanying text (discussing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419 (1982)). 
 193 Underkuffler, supra note 65, at 2035–37. 
 194 See id. at 2016 (“It is the inability of the Court to intellectually reconcile the incompatibil-
ity of the ideas of property and change—indeed, to acknowledge the problem of property and 
change—that lies at the core of its incoherent takings jurisprudence.”). 
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breeds detrimental results that could otherwise be avoided through the ap-
plication of the more rational edges theory. 
In order to illustrate the utility of the edges theory which this Article 
advocates, in this Part we review three contemporary instances where 
courts’ and legislatures’ responses to technological and geophysical change 
have been handicapped by an attachment to, and over-reliance on, the uni-
tary property view.195 Specifically, Section A examines lead poisoning and 
ownership of water lines,196 Section B examines drones and rights in the 
low-airspace,197 and Section C examines climate change and rights in the 
shoreline.198 With respect to each, we first explain how the unitary approach 
enshrines a binary public-private boundary test that has complicated—indeed, 
at times, even actively sabotaged—attempts to tackle the relevant challenge. 
We then argue that this Article’s competing, more nuanced, edges approach 
can greatly aid in handling those daunting, novel real-world problems. 
A. Water Lines and Lead Poisoning 
Most Americans live in localities where drinking water is provided by 
a public water system (“PWS”).199 Indeed, most property owners have no 
realistic alternative to using a PWS for drinking water.200 The service lines 
that connect the PWS to the owner’s home are, we will argue, a quintessen-
tial private property edge. Before making this argument, however, we doc-
                                                                                                                           
 195 See infra notes 199–310 and accompanying text. 
 196 See infra notes 199–253 and accompanying text. 
 197 See infra notes 254–280 and accompanying text. 
 198 See infra notes 281–310 and accompanying text. 
 199 See Information About Public Water Systems, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.
gov/dwreginfo/information-about-public-water-systems [https://perma.cc/VXS3-VRP6] (“The 
public drinking water systems regulated by EPA and delegated states and tribes provide drinking 
water to 90 percent of Americans.”). 
 200 Aside from cost considerations, zoning and other local regulatory restrictions make private 
drinking-water wells infeasible outside rural areas. The FHA also mandates a connection public 
water system (“PWS”) where a connection is available. Joe Wallace, FHA Loan Minimum Proper-
ty Requirements in HUD 4000.1: Water Supply, Wells, FHA NEWS & VIEWS (Nov. 23, 2015), 
https://www.fhanewsblog.com/2015/11/fha-loan-minimum-property-requirements-in-hud-4000-1-
water-supply-wells/ [https://perma.cc/5MJ9-HXCA]. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & 
URBAN DEV., FHA SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING POLICY HANDBOOK, HUD 4000.1 (2016) (provid-
ing comprehensive information of FHA Single Family Housing policies). Courts have upheld 
local ordinances mandating connections to a PWS even when residents have wells and there is no 
evidence of water unsafety. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 148–51 
(1909) (holding that D.C. could create a drainage system and that requiring residents, even those 
whose houses were unoccupied at the time, to be included in such did not constitute an unconstitu-
tional taking); Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729, 730–31, 732 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that township 
ordinance requiring residents to hook up to the public water supply and to discontinue use of well 
water in home was based on rational basis to protect public safety and that such a requirement was 
not a compensable taking). 
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ument the reigning approach to rights in the water lines—which defines 
those rights through recourse to the unitary property view and the pri-
vate/public boundary—and the way in which this approach jeopardizes at-
tempts to battle lead poisoning. 
1. The Unitary Approach and Its Effects 
As physical and stable things that cross the boundary of an owner’s 
private property at a defined point, water lines connecting individual prop-
erties to the PWS’s main line (which runs under the center of the street) ap-
pear particularly congenial for regulation under the formal private/public 
property boundary approach. Localities that own and operate PWSs have 
accordingly repeatedly announced their dedication to this framework.201 
The water main line, they claim, is public property, owned by the govern-
ment holding title to the surface street; the lateral service line attaching an 
individual building to the main line is, localities further claim, the private 
property of the owner of the individual building.202 
This formal division of public and private ownership rights in water 
lines is intuitively appealing, and for more than a century, there was little 
reason to question its coherence. Modern scientific discoveries, however, 
have shown that certain water-related phenomena refuse to abide by this 
unitary ownership approach to the lines carrying water. Moreover, the legal 
attachment to that unitary approach undercuts the ability to confront the 
problem—namely, lead poisoning—that those phenomena generate. 
Lead has been a building block of human civilization for millennia.203 
Going back to Ancient Roman times, lead pipes were used to deliver spring 
water to homes,204 as well as to line channels of public aqueducts.205 The 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See generally Letter from Jessica Chavez, Attorney, Earthjustice, to the U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency 1–5 (Nov. 11 2014), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/06/30/document_
daily_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/87UD-MCH4]) [hereinafter Earthjustice Letter] (providing back-
ground on the development of PWSs across the country and the contemporary debate over partial 
line replacement and determining public versus private ownership of lateral lines); Sheila Kaplan 
& Corbin Hiar, How an EPA Project Backfired, Endangering Drinking Water with Lead, NBC 
News Investigations (Aug. 8, 2012), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/08/131793
35-how-an-epa-project-backfired-endangering-drinking-water-with-lead [https://perma.cc/DWT9-
DAXY] (quoting a survey of utilities where sixty-nine percent disclaimed any ownership of lateral 
lines). 
 202 See Earthjustice Letter, supra note 201, at 2–5. 
 203 History of Lead, INT’L LEAD ASS’N, https://www.ila-lead.org/lead-facts/history-of-lead 
[https://perma.cc/TC9G-DXP8]. 
 204 Thomas Sumner, ScienceShot: Did Lead Poisoning Bring Down Ancient Rome?, SCI. 
MAG. (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/04/scienceshot-did-lead-poisoning-
bring-down-ancient-rome [https://perma.cc/8Q8P-8BY8]. 
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material holds many advantages: it melts at a relatively low temperature and 
is extremely malleable, so it is easily cast, shaped and joined; it is abundant-
ly available (lead can be extracted from ore); and its durability surpasses 
that of most other metals.206 At the same time, some always suspected that 
lead could be poisonous.207 Benjamin Franklin complained that the “mis-
chievous Effect” of lead had been known for years yet ignored, demonstrat-
ing “how long a useful Truth maybe known . . . before it is generally re-
ceiv’d and pracis’d on.”208 
The “useful Truth” about lead was largely ignored during the construc-
tion of water supply systems in the two centuries following Franklin’s 
death. The installation of lead pipes in the United States on a major scale 
began in the late 1800s.209 By the dawn of the twentieth century, over sev-
enty percent of cities with populations greater than thirty thousand utilized 
water lines made of lead.210 The use probably peaked in the 1930s and 
gradually decreased thereafter.211 Still, professional standards continued to 
recognize lead as a suitable material for water pipes, and city ordinances in 
major citiessuch as New York and Bostonpersisted in approving or 
even encouraging its use.212 Until Congress banned lead pipes in 1986, a 
Chicago ordinance actually mandated lead piping.213 Consequently, today, 
as many as three hundred thousand households in Chicago receive drinking 
water through lead service lines.214 Across the country, there are over six 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Lead Poisoning and Rome, ENCYCLOPAEDIA ROMANA, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/~grout/
encyclopaedia_romana/wine/leadpoisoning.html [https://perma.cc/H6JM-5GK6]. 
 206 Properties of Lead, INT’L LEAD ASS’N, https://www.ila-lead.org/UserFiles/File/factbook/
chapter2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HRL8-W64E]. 
 207 See Lead Poisoning and Rome, supra note 205 (noting that Vitruvius wrote, during the 
time of Emperor Augustus, that “there can be no doubt that [lead] itself cannot be a wholesome 
body”). 
 208 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (July 31, 1786), in 7 NEW SOLU-
TIONS 80 (1998). 
 209 WERNER TROESKEN, THE GREAT LEAD WATER PIPE DISASTER 9–10 (2006). 
 210 Richard Rabin, The Lead Industry and Lead Water Pipes, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1584, 
1585 (2008); see TROESKEN, supra note 209, at 11 tbl.1.1 (providing data about major American 
cities with lead pipes in 1900). 
 211 Rabin, supra note 210, at 1589–90. 
 212 Id. at 1590. 
 213 Michael Hawthorne & Peter Matuszak, As Other Cities Dig Up Pipes Made of Toxic Lead, 
Chicago Resists, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-
lead-water-pipes-funding-20160921-story.html [https://perma.cc/3HW7-XNN6]. 
 214 Pam Zekman, 2 Investigators: Cost of Replacing Lead Service Lines Is on Chicago Home 
Owners, CBS CHI. (Dec. 8, 2016), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2016/12/08/2-investigators-cost-of-
replacing-lead-service-lines-is-on-chicago-home-owners/ [https://perma.cc/SR99-M6YG]. 
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million lead service lines,215 and eighteen million people still receive water 
from a water supplier known to be in violation of EPA lead standards.216 
Unsurprisingly, many of these lead service lines are located in low-income 
neighborhoods.217 
The large number of lead lines might not have been of great concern 
had Franklin’s “useful Truth” not been firmly established by scientific find-
ings over the past four decades, to the degree that it is now unquestionably 
“generally receiv’d.” Since the 1970s, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) has repeatedly lowered its threshold for “safe” exposure 
to lead,218 and today public health experts and federal agencies agree that 
there is no such safe level.219 Even low levels of lead in drinking water pose 
an untenable risk to pregnant women, infants, and children.220 As long as 
pipes are made of lead, this risk is unavoidable because lead leaching from 
pipes is always possible.221 Accordingly, experts concur that the only way to 
eliminate lead poisoning risk is to replace all lead water lines.222 
                                                                                                                           
 215 ERIK OLSEN & KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK, NRDC, WHAT’S IN YOUR WATER? FLINT AND 
BEYOND 21 (2016) [hereinafter NRDC REPORT], https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/whats-
in-your-water-flint-beyond-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3W6-KAT9]. 
 216 Id. at 5. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that localities under-report violations, so the 
figure understates lead exposure’s extent. David A. Dana, Escaping the Abdication Trap When 
Cooperative Federalism Fails: Legal Reform After Flint, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1329, 1337 
(2017). 
 217 NRDC REPORT, supra note 215, at 19–20. 
 218 Joshua Schneyer & M.B. Pell, Exclusive: CDC Considers Lowering Threshold Level for 
Lead Exposure, REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lead-cdc/
exclusive-cdc-considers-lowering-threshold-level-for-lead-exposure-idUSKBN14J160 [https://
perma.cc/7HNR-7L7M]. 
 219 See Lead, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.cdc.
gov/nceh/lead/ [https://perma.cc/RB54-BV4R] (“No safe blood lead level in children has been identi-
fied.”); Basic Information About Lead in Drinking Water, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.
epa.gov/ground-water-and-drinking-water/basic-information-about-lead-drinking-water [https://
perma.cc/HN9Y-7YJS]; see also Jessica Pupovac, Lead Levels Below EPA Limits Can Still Impact 
Your Health, NPR (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/13/489
825051/lead-levels-below-epa-limits-can-still-impact-your-health [https://perma.cc/ETN8-3XFB] 
(“No amount of lead is known to be safe.”). 
 220 Rabin, supra note 210, at 1586. 
 221 Infusing corrosion control chemicals into the water can lessen the risk of lead leaching, but 
it cannot eliminate that risk. Dana, supra note 216, at 1344. Furthermore, as recent events in Flint, 
Michigan, showed, control management is subject to human error. See id. at 1341–42 (discussing 
the detrimental effects of treating water quality as a solely local, rather than federal, concern in 
Flint, Michigan). Moreover, storm damage and road repair can result in lead discharges into water 
even when chemical treatment to inhibit corrosion is employed. See, e.g., Jennifer Larino, New 
Orleans Road Work Could Raise Lead Levels in Your Water, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(July 12, 2017), https://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2017/07/lead_water_new_orleans_
road_wo.html [https://perma.cc/7Q29-FJJT]. 
 222 NRDC REPORT, supra note 215, at 6; see 40 C.F.R. § 141.84(b)(1) (2007) (codifying the 
EPA’s Lead & Copper Rule (“LCR”)). 
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Unfortunately, water line replacement is expensive: nationally, esti-
mates run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.223 Who should foot this 
bill? The formal, unitary ownership regime provides an easy answer: the 
water main line is owned by the local government, and thus is to be re-
placed by the public. Conversely, the lateral service line connecting the 
main line to the private owner’s home and running (in large part) beneath 
the owner’s land is owned by the homeowner and should thus be replaced 
by him or her.224 The EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule from 2000 reflects this 
approach, extending a PWS’s responsibility to replace lead pipes only to 
lines that the PWS owns.225 The financial responsibilities, according to the 
EPA’s rule, are thus neatly divided along the boundary between private and 
public property.226 
For their part, localities often maintain that they are prohibited from 
replacing the lateral lines, which they deem private.227 They contend that 
                                                                                                                           
 223 Matthew Dolan, U.S. Could Face a $300B Lead Pipe Overhaul, Agency Warns, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/
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Clark, supra. 
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arguedand EPA agreedthat a “control”-based rule would foster disputes and delays. See EPA, 
LEAD AND COPPER RULE REVISIONS WHITE PAPER 9 (Oct. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2016-10/documents/508_lcr_revisions_white_paper_final_10.26.16.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XTK3-GYZZ] [hereinafter LEAD RULE REVISIONS WHITE PAPER]. But see Jessica 
Pupovac, Where Lead Lurks and Why Even Small Amounts Matter, NPR (Aug. 12, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/12/483079525/where-lead-lurks-and-why-even-
small-amounts-matter [https://perma.cc/645Z-XLF6] (discussing continuing criticisms of the EPA 
rule). 
 226 See 40 C.F.R. § 141.86(a) (2007) (“Monitoring requirements for lead and copper in tap 
water.”). 
 227 Localities base this position on two arguments. First, lines are appurtenant to private struc-
tures and thereby take on private status, like antennas or attached garages. Second, historically in 
many places, landowners were legally required to pay for extending a line from the water main to 
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state constitutional and statutory law provides that utilities may expend 
funds only for a public purpose.228 It follows, in localities’ view, that they 
are thus barred from spending money to replace lines on the private side of 
the public/private ownership divide.229 
This reliance on a clear formal dividing line may appear rather rational 
as a matter of abstract law, but as a matter of actual policy, it ends up un-
commonly irrational. Overwhelmingly, the invocation of a formal dividing 
line has had two results, both undesirable. First, many localities with lead 
main and lateral lines have avoided replacing any lines.230 In these locali-
ties, the risk of lead exposure has not been abated. Second, in other locali-
ties, such as Chicago,231 and Washington, D.C.,232 the locality has undertak-
en the replacement of main lines but has refused to replace lateral lines un-
less the private homeowner pays for such themselves.  
Homeowners, unfortunately, have funded very few lateral line replace-
ments under this approach.233 This might be due to the fact that homeown-
ers do not understand the threat lead pipes pose234 or because they are una-
ble to afford the thousands of dollars necessary for lateral line replace-
                                                                                                                           
private structures. See Memorandum from Jennifer Chavez, Attorney, Earthjustice, at 11 (Apr. 7, 
2017) (on file with authors). Neither argument is compelling. Lateral lines are equally appurtenant 
to the water main, which is undisputedly public property; furthermore, appurtenance is often not 
determinant of a property’s status (for example, meter boxes and mailboxes are not classified as 
private property). Additionally, landowners have long been required to sometimes pay for certain 
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 228 See 71 AM. JUR. 2D STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 36 (2018) (“Constitutional basis of 
requirement of public purpose.”). 
 229 See, e.g., Tiffany Stecker, Federal Law Makes Lead-Pipe Removal Anything but a Cinch, 
E&E NEWS (July 7, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060039790 [https://perma.cc/8KCP-
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partment of the Environment at the time when the city experienced a lead water crisis). 
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struction Projects, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/elgin-
courier-news/news/ct-ecn-elgin-construction-delays-st-0425-story.html [https://perma.cc/H9YX-
YNRB] (discussing a Chicago suburb’s city council’s recent decision to continue to postpone lead 
pipe replacements). 
 231 See Hawthorne & Matuszak, supra note 213 (noting that, although “Chicago has more lead 
service lines than any other city. . . . administration officials say it is up to individual homeowners 
to decide whether it is worth replacing the[ir lateral] pipes at their own expense”). 
 232 Replacement Occurs During Construction or by Request, D.C. WATER, https://www.
dcwater.com/lead-pipe-replacement [https://perma.cc/6YGU-WZ3S]. 
 233 For example, despite a major, multi-year campaign by Washington, D.C., to convince 
owners to finance replacement of the service lines, only twenty-five percent agreed. Stecker, supra 
note 229. 
 234 See LEAD RULE REVISIONS WHITE PAPER, supra note 225, at 9 (recommending “[t]argeted 
outreach to customers with lean service lines (“LSL”), with information about the risks of lead 
exposure”) 
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ment.235 Regardless of the cause, the EPA was incorrect when it predicted 
that homeowners would readily fund private line replacements.236 The out-
come in many places is, accordingly, partial replacement (in other words, 
replacement of the main but not of lateral lines)—an unpropitious strategy. 
No credible expert or professional association maintains that partial re-
placement of lead lines substantially reduces lead risks.237 Moreover, partial 
line replacement often discharges lead particles and, as a result, actually 
raises lead levels at the water tap at least temporarily.238 A group of home-
owners in Chicago recently sued the city, plausibly alleging that Chicago’s 
partial replacement was exposing residents to more lead than ever before.239 
2. The Edges Approach 
The legal attachment to a unitary worldview neatly dividing private 
from public ownership rights along the water line is thus inadequate for 
solving the problems that materialize along that line. An acknowledgment 
of the mingling of public and private interests on the lateral water line—
precipitating an edges-style legal solution—is therefore necessary. 
Such an edges-based approach to tackling the problem of lead would 
also be much more in line with the actual regime the law has applied to wa-
ter lines ever since their introduction. Historically, when defining rights and 
duties in water lines, the law never truly focused on the private/public 
boundary that localities and regulators now sanctify. Rather, in practice as 
opposed to rhetoric, the law identified the water line as, to use this Article’s 
novel term, an edge, where public and private rights (and duties) co-exist. 
First, the law has sometimes ignored formal property boundaries in its 
characterization scheme of the portion of the lateral line running between 
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 236 Stecker, supra note 229. 
 237 See REBECCA RENNER, REACTION TO THE SOLUTION at A202 (2010), https://ehp.niehs.
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National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for Lead and Copper, 65 Fed. Reg. 1950, 1964 
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the boundary of the owner’s private land and the center of the street. As 
previously noted, local ordinances generally characterize the line situated 
below the owner’s land as private. Conversely, the main line situated below 
the center of the street is public. In between, however, the water line con-
necting the individual home to the main, generally runs underneath a public 
space: the sidewalk area. Based on the formal private/public boundary and a 
unitary approach, this portion of the line, like the main, must be labelled 
public.240 Yet the public does not benefit from this portion of the service 
line: unlike the main, its sole beneficiary is the private owner. Thus, some 
localities have always conceived it as private.241 
Second, and similarly, the lateral service line located underneath the 
private owner’s property, though formally privately-owned, was never 
treated by lawmakers as quite the equivalent of the owner’s private home. 
The private owner does not enjoy much freedom with respect to “her” ser-
vice line. Laws do not allow her to interfere with it without public approval; 
all work must be conducted by the public utility company.242 Needless to 
say, the owner is not subject to such debilitating regulation elsewhere on her 
land, say in her home. Furthermore, the owner does not even enjoy the free-
dom to simply choose not to have the lateral line. Owners are required to 
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2019] Property’s Edges 799 
allow the locality to lay the lines, they are forced to pay for them, and, when 
connecting their homes to the lines, they must abide by the PWS’s construc-
tion criteria. Courts across the nation—and even the U.S. Supreme Court—
have routinely upheld such requirements.243 These cases acknowledge the 
great power that the public exercises over the water delivery system to pri-
vate homes, fully disregarding the unitary vision of property that would 
equate the private ownership status of the lateral line with that of the home 
itself.244 
Therefore, despite the formalistic claims discussed in the previous 
Subsection, the legal treatment of lateral water lines does not truly perceive 
the boundary between private and public property as determinative in set-
ting rights and duties associated with such lines. The public side of the 
boundary is not totally public, and the private side is not totally private. Be-
cause the law treats the lateral service line as an edge of private property, 
with coexisting private and public elements, the popular solution that locali-
ties currently use to address the lead problem in such lines—designating 
replacement as a purely private obligation—is not only unsatisfactory, but 
also unwarranted given the logic of existing law. Because lateral water lines 
not only should be, but are, private property edges, local governments ought 
to recognize the replacement of such lines as a shared responsibility be-
tween the private owner and the public. 
Models for this approach are found in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as 
well as in Madison and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Following the lead poison-
ing crisis in Flint, Michigan, the Pennsylvania Legislature endorsed a hy-
brid, public-private, edges approach, that empowers municipalities to raise 
water rates to cover lateral line replacement but specifies that the lines re-
main private.245 Following the statute’s enactment, Pittsburgh established a 
                                                                                                                           
 243 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 147, 150 (1909) (upholding re-
quirement for residents to comply with a District of Columbia statute regulating connection of 
home to water main and public sewer). 
 244 See, e.g., Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729, 734 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that township ordi-
nance requiring residents to hook up to the public water supply and to discontinue use of well 
water in home was based on rational basis to protect public safety and that such a requirement was 
not a compensable taking); Citizens for Personal Water Rights v. Borough of Hughesville, 815 
A.2d 15, 16, 22 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (upholding ordinance that required all owners of im-
proved property to connect to the municipal water system). 
 245 For a description of the statute, see Liz Navratil, Legislature Passes Bill to Help Home-
owners Replace Lead Water Lines, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.
post-gazette.com/news/state/2017/10/24/Amid-budget-woes-state-legislature-passes-bill-affecting-
PWSA/stories/201710240207 [https://perma.cc/AYE6-LMD3]. 
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program to replace all lead water lines at public expense, with a determina-
tion to act quickest in areas where lead risks were gravest.246 
Madison, Wisconsin offers an even more appealing model of a cost-
sharing edges solution. A 2013 ordinance required the city to replace lateral 
lines if the homeowner consents to the payment of fifty percent of the cost 
(in most cases, one thousand to fifteen hundred dollars).247 Low-income, 
low-asset, or otherwise distressed homeowners could apply for further re-
imbursement of any portion of the cost. Therefore, the private share of re-
sponsibility for this property edge was, in effect, flexible and needs-based. 
As a result, all lead lines in Madison were replaced with non-lead lines.248 
Milwaukee attempted to follow this model, but because its program is much 
less comprehensive in requiring and subsidizing replacement, the rate of 
lateral line replacement has been slow, generating frustration among activ-
ists.249 
The success of these model solutions to the lead lines problem depend-
ed on local governments embracing and acting upon the edges view of wa-
ter lines. Other legal actors could perhaps aid in promoting such solutions 
by similarly denying the unitary property view in this context. One such 
actor is the EPA, that can change its 2000 rule to require PWSs to replace 
lead lines they control in any way, rather than only ones they formally own. 
An advisory committee recently urged the EPA to act in this fashion.250 Alt-
hough the EPA appears hesitant to do so,251 public interest groups have 
made similar recommendations.252 Another relevant actor that could pro-
                                                                                                                           
 246 Kristina Marusic & Stephen Caruso, Who Should Be Responsible for Replacing Pitts-
burgh’s Lead Water Pipes?, PUB. SOURCE (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.publicsource.org/who-
should-be-responsible-for-replacing-pittsburghs-lead-water-pipes/ [https://perma.cc/5C4L-N6TS]. 
 247 See MADISON, WIS., CODE § 13.18 (2013), https://www.cityofmadison.com/sites/default/
files/city-of-madison/water/documents/MGO%2013%2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH6J-T5XD]. 
 248 EPA Looks to Madison as Leader on Lead Pipe Issue, MADISON WATER UTIL. (Jan. 4, 
2016), https://www.cityofmadison.com/water/insidemwu/epa-looks-to-madison-as-leader-on-lead-
pipe-issue [https://perma.cc/FYM2-HV26]. 
 249 Mark Johnson et al., Long Before Milwaukee Lead Poisoning Fallout, Mayor Tom Bar-
rett’s Staff Was Given Warning, J. SENTINEL (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.jsonline.com/story/
news/local/milwaukee/2018/01/19/long-before-milwaukee-lead-poisoning-fallout-top-mayor-tom-
barrett-official-given-warning/1045389001/ [https://perma.cc/3MTL-RNF3]. 
 250 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL REPORT OF THE LEAD AND COPPER RULE WORKING GROUP 
TO THE NATIONAL DRINKING WATER ADVISORY COUNCIL 18 (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/ndwaclcrwgfinalreportaug2015.pdf [https://perma.
cc/WZ5K-4XVE]. 
 251 See LEAD RULE REVISIONS WHITE PAPER, supra note 225, at 8 (“There are important 
legal questions about EPA’s authority to mandate replacement of privately-owned portions of 
lines and about water systems’ authority under state or local law to require and/or pay for such 
replacement.”). 
 252 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jennifer Chavez, supra note 227, at 1, 10–15 (providing 
Earthjustice’s recommendation for the City of Milwaukee to take ownership of lateral service 
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mote effective edges solutions is the judiciary. Courts could facilitate public 
replacement of lateral lines by declaring them public property for the spe-
cific purpose of allocating financial responsibility for their maintenance and 
treatment. That is, courts should explicitly endorse this Article’s approach 
by renouncing the unitary property view and instead characterizing lateral 
water lines as property edges. 
This proposed move draws on the three general justifications—
normative, empirical, and administrative—that we provided for the edges 
view in Part II. Given scientific findings with respect to water lines, the on-
ly efficient development policy—one of property law’s normative goals—is 
the expeditious replacement of all lead lines. This eventuality can only be 
assured through shared responsibility between the individual owner—who 
is the primary, and most direct, beneficiary of replacement—and the pub-
lic—which must deal with lead poisoning’s public health hazards.  
The edges view also comports with owners’ reasonable expectations. 
Water lines are not visible structures situated at a lot’s center. They are hid-
den structures, whose undisclosed presence is mandated by the locality. 
Most property owners never focus on water lines’ existence upon acquiring 
their land or thereafter. Even where owners do notice the lateral water lines 
crossing their property, they reasonably regard them as the equivalents of 
utility lines (electricity or phone). In American law, such utility lines are 
owned by the locality or utility company, not the private owner—regardless 
of where those lines happen to be located.253 
Finally, as the unfortunate experiences of Chicago and Washington, 
D.C., illustrate, from an administrative perspective, acting on the unitary 
property vision invites contention, confusion, delay, and ultimately litiga-
tion over the question of who bears responsibility for lead-related harms. 
The water line example thus emphasizes the necessity of adopting the edges 
approach if the dire costs associated with the unitary vision’s boundary fet-
ishism are to be avoided. 
                                                                                                                           
lines, a proposal contrary to the City’s ordinance mandating lead line replacement at the partial 
expense of the landowner). 
 253 See, e.g., Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television, 212 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(holding that cable television company’s installation of wires to telephone pole on owners’ proper-
ty was within scope of easement and that company did not need owners’ consent for such installa-
tion); Henley v. Cont’l Cablevision of St. Louis Cty., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1985) (holding that cable television company was permitted by 1922 easement to enter housing 
subdivision for installation and maintenance of coaxial cables). 
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B. Drones and Rights in the Low Airspace 
The misleading nature of the unitary property vision as applied to wa-
ter lines was ignored with little cost until the emergence of new scientific 
findings about lead poisoning. Similarly, the introduction of new aerial 
technology is rendering the unitary vision of property rights in the low air-
space, heretofore commonplace among lawmakers and observers, increas-
ingly unsustainable. Here too, accordingly, applying the edges view that this 
Article advocates can solve a seemingly intractable legal problem: the in-
vention and then spread of flying objects—unmanned drones—that can fly 
very low above others’ private property. 
1. The Unitary Approach and Its Effects 
As discussed in Part I, in the 1946 Causby decision dealing with air-
planes, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that owners enjoy protected prop-
erty rights above the ground, but confined those rights to the surface proper-
ty’s “immediate reaches.”254 Although the Court did not precisely define 
those “immediate reaches,” the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
designated the airspace above five hundred feet as navigable airspace sub-
ject to full federal control.255 That space is thus clearly beyond the “imme-
diate reaches” of the ground and not subject to private control in American 
law. Aircrafts generally fly at five hundred feet or more above the Earth’s 
surface, except during takeoffs and landings—and public or private airports 
normally own land or navigation easements near their runways.256 For dec-
ades, therefore, there were no substantial conflicts over rights in the low 
airspace—and thus no need to explore the ramifications of the unitary prop-
erty vision which supposedly applied to that specific space.257 This conven-
                                                                                                                           
 254 See generally United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); supra notes 104–109 and 
accompanying text (discussing Causby). 
 255 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b) (2010). 256 Moreover, conflicts respecting airports involving 
private landowners are governed by a thick web of regulation inapplicable in other settings. See 
generally KAI MING LI ET AL, PARTNERSHIP FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION NOISE & EMISSIONS 
REDUCTION, LAND USE MANAGEMENT AND AIRPORT CONTROLS, PARTNER REPORT NO.: 
PARTNER-COE-2008-001 (2007), http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/partner/reports/landmgt-proj6-
2008-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UGU-ULX6] (examining land use and noise complaint patterns 
and interactions near several airports). 
 256 Moreover, conflicts respecting airports involving private landowners are governed by a 
thick web of regulation inapplicable in other settings. See generally KAI MING LI ET AL, PART-
NERSHIP FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION NOISE & EMISSIONS REDUCTION, LAND USE MANAGEMENT 
AND AIRPORT CONTROLS, PARTNER REPORT NO.: PARTNER-COE-2008-001 (2007), http://
web.mit.edu/aeroastro/partner/reports/landmgt-proj6-2008-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UGU-ULX6] 
(examining land use and noise complaint patterns and interactions near several airports). 
 257 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 112, at 89, 142 (arguing that the basic ad-coelum rule 
had no need to be made precise until airplanes’ invention). 
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ient circumstance was recently disturbed by the growing popularity of pri-
vately-owned drones. 
Unmanned aircrafts—drones—have existed for decades, but only over 
the past ten years did they become objects of mass civilian production—and 
mass civilian use. They are now accessible and affordable for almost all 
industries and individual users.258 As the use of these low-flying vehicles 
proliferates, the need to assess public rights to enter the low airspace above 
private property intensifies. The unitary, boundary-focused, approach offers 
a readily available answer: some determined height should dictate the line 
between private and public. And although no court has yet addressed the 
issue,259 the solutions commentators and several state statutes offer have 
drawn on this approach. 
Scholars have advocated the clear boundary approach whereby surface 
owners would have a full property right to exclude drones flying at an alti-
tude lower than five hundred feet above their land.260 Two states have en-
acted drone-specific statutes reflecting this clear boundary approach. Ore-
gon empowers owners to sue the operator of a drone flying at four hundred 
feet or less above their land if they had previously notified the operator of 
their objection to entry.261 Nevada authorizes a landowner to pursue the op-
erator of a drone flown fewer than 250 feet over her property.262 
Irrespective of the specific boundary-line delineated, these unitary ap-
proaches to the problem are not without their appeal. Most significantly, 
they provide a neat solution that seemingly draws on established precedents 
respecting aerial navigation. Still, in the long-run they are unlikely to solve 
the drone problem; rather, they will exacerbate it—a potentiality which 
might explain the reluctance of most states and the FAA to endorse such 
solutions.263 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to Do-
mestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2014) (explaining how the rapid 
growth of the drone industry has made unmanned aerial vehicles “smaller, more sophisticated, and 
cheaper” for all types of users). 
 259 In the only case to date directly addressing a private conflict over drones, Boggs v. Mere-
dith, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, 2017 WL 1088093 (E.D. Ky. 2017), a drone was shot down by an 
angry landowner. The court held that there was no federal jurisdiction, even though the issue of 
whether the drone was gravelling in federal airspace conceivably could be raised as a defense to a 
trespass to chattels claim. 
 260 See A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones, 
48 CONN. L. REV 1, 56 (2015) (calling for “a clear minimum height restriction for drone over-
flights of private property”); Troy A. Rule, Drone Zoning, 95 N.C. L. REV. 133, 159, 171–72 
(2016) (arguing for establishing clearer “entitlements in low-altitude airspace”). 
 261 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.380(4)–(6) (West 2016). 
 262 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.103 (West 2015). 
 263 The FAA reads its regulatory jurisdiction as extending well below 500 feet, depending on 
circumstances. See Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217, 2014 WL 8095629, at *8 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6, 2014) 
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The clear boundary approach is likely both excessively restrictive and 
excessively permissive. It would nip the technology in the bud by making 
drones’ widespread use dependent on obtaining surface owners’ permission. 
Determining who has surface rights at each and every spot above which a 
drone is flying, and then negotiating for permission with each holder of 
such rights, could entail very high transaction costs.264 Surface owners with 
no actual objection might nevertheless hold out in order to secure the high-
est possible payment.265 Moreover, to the extent the boundary approach 
would privilege owners to shoot down drones as self-help against tres-
pass, 266 drone operators may understandably find it prudent to refrain com-
pletely from flying through the low airspace. The abandonment of drone 
technology—which these outgrowths of the unitary approach should precip-
itate—would almost certainly be socially inefficient. Plausible claims 
abound that drones are to become a major contributor to the economy and 
public welfare. Drones could breed dramatic improvements in myriad vital 
fields: from the production of better maps for individual users, utility com-
panies, and first responders,267 to the delivery of food and goods at greater 
                                                                                                                           
(decisional order) (noting that, under the FAA’s interpretation, even “a flight in the air, e.g., a paper 
aircraft, or a toy balsa wood glider, could subject the ‘operator’ to” an FAA enforcement action). The 
FAA, however, appears less insistent than before that state regulation is flatly preempted even in the 
low airspace. Still, the question of the outer reach of the FAA’s authority remains unresolved. See 
Jason Snead, The FAA Is Empowering States to Regulate Drones. Why That’s a Win for Everyone, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/
the-faa-empowering-states-regulate-drones-why-thats-win-everyone [https://perma.cc/3HLA-R8DN] 
(discussing the dispute between the FAA and states over whether state regulation of drones is pre-
empted by federal law). In 2015, the California legislature refused to pass a bill that would make 
any drone overflight that was below 350 feet a trespass. Gregory S. McNeal, California’s Drone 
Trespass Bill Goes Too Far, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/
2015/08/11/californias-drone-trespass-bill-goes-too-far/ [https://perma.cc/7UD2-3A48]. 
 264 See Should You Be Allowed to Prevent Drones from Flying Over Your Property? Two 
Legal Experts Debate Who Has the Right to Decide When and Where Drones Will Fly, WALL ST. 
J. (May 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-you-be-allowed-to-prevent-drones-from-
flying-over-your-property-1463968981 [https://perma.cc/3L5T-FCE7] (providing a debate be-
tween two legal schools of thought regarding who should be able to determine where drones can 
fly, as well as the associated costs and benefits of such determinations). 
 265 See id. 
 266 See Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 260, at 30–35, 56 (suggesting that self-help against 
trespassing drones should be privileged). 
 267 See Chad Garland, Sempra Energy Gets FAA Approval to Test Drones for San Diego Utili-
ty, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-drones-utilities-20140712-
story.html [https://perma.cc/C6D2-6UAD] (discussing the use of drones by utilities companies); 
Alexis C. Madrigal, Inside the Drone Missions to Fukushima, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/04/inside-the-drone-missions-to-fukushima/
237981/ [https://perma.cc/JHM4-J9K8] (highlighting the use of drones to explore a nuclear power 
plant disaster site ahead of first responders). 
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speeds with a decreased environmental footprint,268 to the monitoring of 
crops and the combatting of pest infestations.269 Drones could thus revolu-
tionize the economy as profoundly as trains, cars, trucks, and conventional 
airplanes previously did. Therefore, the unitary approach’s outright exclu-
sion of drones from the low airspace would deprive society of some of the 
benefits drones otherwise could provide. 
Concurrently, the approach’s clear boundary rule may fail to effectively 
protect surface owners. As commentators and statutes recognize, the main 
threat that drones pose to owners is the potential interference with privacy 
through the aerial recording of information found in, and activities taking 
place on, an owner’s land.270 But that threat is not presented by flights in the 
low airspace alone. Technological advancements have made it exceptionally 
easy for high-flying drones (as well as manned vehicles) to record detailed 
information regarding the surface far below.271 Under the unitary approach, 
however, drones are wholly free to employ these advancedand intru-
siverecording devices if they are flying in “public” airspace. 
2. The Edges Approach 
The boundary-focused unitary approach to property in the low airspace 
exemplifies the general normative drawback of the unitary property view as 
identified in Part II.B.: the approach clings to a formalistic property defini-
tion in complete defiance of property’s goals in promoting efficient land 
development and privacy. An alternative edges approach will offer a nu-
anced, flexible interpretation of both the owner’s and the public’s rights, 
serving the interests of efficient deployment of a new technology and safe-
guarding owners’ privacy interests. 
An edges approach will also be much more faithful to the Causby 
precedent, which has been setting owners’ expectations in the field for more 
than seventy years. As previously noted, in distinguishing the owner’s pri-
vate sphere from the public’s, the Court in Causby relied on an inherently 
fuzzy term: the surface’s “immediate reaches.” The Court further urged a 
nuisance-like, case-by-case test to determine whether the owner could de-
                                                                                                                           
 268 See, e.g., Jim Lyza, Could Drones Give Your Package a Sustainable Lift?, GREENBIZ (May 
2, 2014), https://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/05/02/could-drones-give-your-package-sustainable-
lift [https://perma.cc/5UC9-3EW3]. 
 269 See Saurabh Anand, Hovering on the Horizon, 26 AIR & SPACE L. 9, 9–10 (2013). 
 270 See Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 260, at 1, 4, 60 (“Is the fear that a drone may be 
operated by a paparazzo or a Peeping Tom sufficient grounds to disable or interfere with it?”). 
 271 See Farber, supra note 258, at 4, 11–15 (“[D]rones can spy on you from vantage points 
that homeowners have historically had no reason to fear. In addition, drones can spy without tres-
passing.”). 
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mand compensation for aerial uses of those immediate reaches. The Court 
thereby implicitly recognized the low airspace—and not merely airspace in 
general—as an edge: a place where private and public interests are both 
present and where the formal boundary is of limited consequence. What 
should matter in such an edge space, according to the Causby decision, are 
actual and substantive harms to the interests of either party. 
In light of this edges approach to the low airspace, when dealing with 
the new challenge of drones, contemporary law should recognize that wher-
ever the formal boundary of private ownership might be set, some drone 
flights within the “private” airspace may be wholly unproblematic whereas 
some flight in the “public” airspace may be highly problematic. Case-by-case 
tort litigation coupled with flexible state privacy statutes and rational local 
drone zoning, all focusing on the actual harm to the surface owner’s interests, 
is the best means of accommodating the competing public and private inter-
ests in the property edges of low airspace. This nuanced approach might, at 
least in the short term, increase litigation, but it will certainly refocus any 
such drone-related litigation on the issues that are actually relevant—concrete 
harms drones engender. Furthermore, over time, as precedents define the na-
ture and extent of harms required for a successful tort claim, some claims 
against drones will not be brought and many others could be dealt with 
promptly. 
Useful guidance for the desirable tort standards is offered by the Re-
statement’s test for trespass by an “aircraft” into private airspace—although 
adopted early-on and formally inapplicable to drones (it exempts “missiles[] 
and the like”). That test eschews boundary fetishism in affixing liability, al-
lowing a lawsuit only when the aircraft entering the surface’s immediate 
reaches “interferes substantially with the [owner]’s use and enjoyment of his 
[or her] land.”272 This standard permits a balancing of interests. The more the 
surface activity calls for seclusion, the likelier an intrusion to be found. If the 
standard were applied to drones, the immediate reaches of a private home, for 
example, would be more protected than the immediate reaches of a commer-
cial parking structure. Liability would similarly be likelier the more disruptive 
the drone. A noisy, lingering, or unsightly drone would be treated more harsh-
ly than a discreet, silent one quickly passing overhead.273 
                                                                                                                           
 272 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 159(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 273 State courts have generally focused on some combination of the aircraft’s altitude and the 
time it hovers in identifying a substantial interference. See, e.g., Bevers v. Gaylord Broad. Co., 
No. 05-01-00895-CV, 2002 WL 1582286, at *1, *6 (Tex. Ct. App. July 18, 2002) (holding that a 
helicopter that hovered for ten minutes at three hundred to four hundred feet over a home did not 
substantially interfere with the homeowner’s use and enjoyment). 
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Drones’ most substantial—and to lawmakers and commentators, most 
troubling—interference with owners’ use and enjoyment of land is the 
threat that they pose to privacy.274 The regulation of drone trespass into the 
relevant property edges must thus put special emphasis on privacy interests. 
Given this emphasis, the tort of invasion of privacy should be central. The 
Restatement’s “Intrusion Upon Seclusion” section provides that “one who 
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclu-
sion of another . . . is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his pri-
vacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”275 
Significantly, the tort does not focus upon—or even recognize—property 
boundaries in settling liability. Rather, it introduces flexibility through the 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” standard. Under this legal stand-
ard, it would arguably be permissive to operate a drone one hundred feet 
over corn fields as they are being plowed, even if the drone records the 
plowing. In contrast, it arguably would be actionable to operate a drone six 
hundred feet over a pool and record a sunbathing family. 
These common law tort protections against invasion of privacy can be 
augmented if they are codified into state statutes. Statutes can increase con-
sistency and even establish a system of fines and other public penalties. States 
have, in fact, already begun enacting a wide range of statutes at least implicit-
ly addressing drones’ threat to privacy. These statutes mostly avoid—
wisely—the unitary property view.276 The California statute, for example, 
though never explicitly mentioning drones, provides that 
[a] person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the 
person attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a rea-
sonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or 
other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, 
personal, or familial activity, through the use of any device, re-
gardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, 
sound recording, or other physical impression could not have 
been achieved without a trespass unless the device was used.277  
Finally, in regulating drones’ presence in the low-airspace, the desira-
ble edges solution may involve not only state level actors—courts and legis-
latures—but also local governments. Because it is area-specific and codi-
                                                                                                                           
 274 See supra notes 270–271 and accompanying text. 
 275 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B. 
 276 For a recent summary of state laws, see Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 10, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transpor-
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 277 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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fied, local zoning could define what counts as “the immediate reaches” in 
different areas, taking account of diverse property uses and population den-
sities. Such an approach would be sensitive to different communities’ base-
lines of seclusion and varying reasonable expectations regarding its protec-
tion.278 As in other fields of local action, however, local authorities cannot 
be afforded a free-hand to zone drones: they may succumb to anti-drone 
“NIMBYism”279 or create an impossible patchwork of rules.280 State legisla-
tures and (perhaps) the FAA would therefore need to be ready to preempt 
communities that overreach. Nevertheless, some room for local legislation 
should be preserved. 
Overall, the low-airspace edge illustrates how multiple actors and in-
stitutions could productively play a mutually-supporting role in defining 
and redefining the private-public interface along a private property edge. 
C. Climate Change and Rights in the Shoreline 
Water-lines and the low airspace are property edges—that must be 
regulated accordingly. Perhaps the most literal property edge, however, is 
the beach—where the land meets water. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the di-
vide between private property in the land and public property in the water, 
as the two interact at the seashore, is particularly unconducive to a unitary 
view of property, imagining it as consisting of clear boundary lines.281 Es-
pecially in our era of climate change, the current formal regime that the uni-
tary vision has inspired is increasingly exposed as inadequate, as this Sec-
tion will establish before explaining how the edges approach improves on 
that vision’s performance. 
                                                                                                                           
 278 See Rule, supra note 260, at 160–61 (presenting drone zoning’s advantages). 
 279 “NIMBYism” is an acronym for the phrase “Not In My Back Yard.” The term “nimby” is 
defined as “[a] person who objects to the siting of something perceived as unpleasant or hazardous 
in their own neighbourhood, especially while raising no such objections to similar developments 
elsewhere.” Nimby, OXFORD DICTIONARY (2018), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
Nimby [https://perma.cc/9A53-LYDE]. 
 280 For further explanation of the legal limits typically placed on local action due to such 
risks, see generally Nadav Shoked, Cities Taxing New Sins: The Judicial Embrace of Local Excise 
Taxation, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 801 (2018) (discussing the complex patchwork of local excise rules 
and varying judicial embrace of such). 
 281 See Katrina M. Wyman & Nicholas R. Williams, Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
1957, 1967, 1982–83 (2013) (“[T]he mean high water line is not a clear on/off signal. There are 
problems with policing trespassing by members of the public onto private property in beach areas 
due to the uncertainty of the boundary.”). 
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1. The Unitary Approach and Its Effects 
The common law has long held that navigable waters and the land they 
submerge are held by the Crown—later, the government—as the public’s 
trustee.282 Consequently, a private owner may own the adjacent land, but 
she cannot own the land under the water.283 In light of this rule, the need to 
manage the interaction between the private and the public along the shore-
line—where the land and the water meet—is inevitable. Yet the shoreline is 
inhospitable to regulation through the lens of a formal dividing line between 
public (water) and private (land). This is primarily because shorelines are 
not generally stable: their location changes over time.284 
The challenge is obvious: if water levels recede and once-submerged 
land is no longer under water, who is the owner of that “new” land? The 
shoreline—the line between water and land—has physically moved. Did the 
legal boundary between public and private move with it, and does the pri-
vate owner now own more land as a result? And vice versa: what happens if 
water levels increase and previously dry land becomes submerged? Does 
the legal boundary move too, and does the owner therefore lose title to her 
old, now-submerged land? 
The common law answers such complex questions by drawing a for-
mal distinction between gradual and sudden changes. Gradual, impercepti-
ble shifts in the physical boundary between water and land do not shift the 
legal boundary between private and public land; abrupt ones do.285 Thus, 
gradual additions of land on the beach (reliction or accretion) belong to the 
private landowner; sudden additions of land on the beach (avulsion) belong 
to the public. Similarly, gradual losses of land at the beach (erosion) de-
crease the private owner’s holdings; sudden losses of land at the beach (also 
avulsion) decrease the public’s holdings (in other words, the landowner 
could still claim their newly-submerged land).286 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See Josh Eagle, Taking the Oceanfront Lot, 91 IND. L.J. 851, 872 (2016) (“Under English 
common law, the public trust doctrine covered lands beneath waters subject to the ebb and flow of 
the tide; the catalog of protected public uses of trust areas included only navigation, commerce, 
and fishing.”). 
 283 See Colin H. Roberts, It’s All Mine, Stay Off, and Let Me Do What I Please: An Abyss 
Between the Rights and Desires of Coastal Property Owners and Public Privileges and Protec-
tions?, 18 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 255, 264 (2013) (“While land below the high-water line is held 
in public trust by the state, the dry-sand beach above it is not within the state’s purview under the 
traditional public trust doctrine.”). 
 284 Wyman & Williams, supra note 281, at 1957–58. 
 285 SINGER, supra note 18, at 172, 534. 
 286 For a full analysis of these concepts, see generally Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion 
Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010) (exploring the 
accretion/avulsion distinction and its contemporary relevance in ascertaining ownership interests 
in the shoreline). 
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This explanation of black-letter law suggests much more clarity than 
ever truly existed in American law. Unsurprisingly, in practice, the line be-
tween “gradual” and “sudden” change is often not easily drawn.287 Courts 
have largely dealt with the inevitable factual uncertainty by labelling practi-
cally all changes as gradual ones.288 This judicial bent was rather random. 
Nevertheless, any ensuing sense of irrationality or unfairness was negated 
by mutuality: such decisions’ inconsistencies would even up in the long-run. 
Owners always won the increases in landmass because additions to the 
shore were almost always deemed gradual, but owners also always lost de-
creases in the landmass because subtractions from the shore were also al-
most always deemed gradual.289 
But once this resultant fairness of the otherwise contrived approach 
was no longer attainable due to natural changes in the global environment, 
the underlying inconsistencies could no longer be ignored.290 Because of 
climate change, ocean water-levels hardly recede anymore—they only 
rise—with the consequence that almost any change to the shoreline takes 
the form of a decrease in the landmass.291 With gradual subtractions con-
stantly present (erosion) but no gradual additions (accretion or reliction) to 
offset them, owners can understandably view the existing legal test, com-
bined with courts’ tendency to characterize all changes as gradual, as 
stacked against them. Owners always, and only, lose land. 
Further complicating this reality, to the extent that additions to land on 
the shoreline still occur, they are mostly the product of public infrastructure 
projects. To stem rising sea-levels and worsening storm conditions, beach 
                                                                                                                           
 287 See Alyson C. Flournoy, Beach Law Cleanup: How Sea-Level Rise Has Eroded the Ambu-
latory Boundaries Legal Framework, 42 VT. L. REV. 89, 91–92 (2017) (“[T]hese doctrines [are] 
vague, lack[] a coherent justification, [are] inefficient, and tend[] to create uncertainty. . . . [T]he 
primary distinction the doctrines draw—between changes that are slow and imperceptible and 
those that are rapid and observable—creates heavy evidentiary demands with little benefit, and is 
ill matched to a reality where many changes reflect a combination of rapid and slow processes.”). 
 288 See Sax, supra note 286, at 348 (noting that courts apply the accretion rule “very gener-
ously”). 
 289 See Flournoy, supra note 287, at 114–15 (discussing the false assumption by common law 
doctrines that “landowners may be winners or losers due to the vagaries of the tides on any given 
day” and explaining how the way in which “courts have invoked the fairness rationale distin-
guishes cases of rapid change from gradual change”; e.g., a determination by a court that an owner 
experienced avulsion of his or her land was generally based in the idea that “[a] sudden and un-
predictable loss entails lack of warning and an inability to prepare for, mitigate, or avoid the loss,” 
warranting the court’s rare “sympathy”). 
 290 See id. at 115–16 (“Today, the dynamic along our coasts is (and will continue to be) pre-
dominantly erosion and inundation.”). 
 291 See Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and Sobs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
19, 25 (2009) (“This is because the rising water level will not simply inundate the shoreline, but 
will induce and accelerate further beach erosion.”). 
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replenishment has become a major focus of coastal communities’ policy.292 
When such governmental projects are challenged for their effects on private 
ownership interests, courts attempt to characterize the projects as either ac-
cretions (gradual) or avulsions (sudden).293 That test, however, is wholly 
irrelevant to any policies involved because it artificially fits manmade phe-
nomena into categories developed to account for natural occurrences. 
The results of such strained judicial moves to accommodate new cli-
mate-related developments into old formal categories have been predictably 
unsatisfactory. Pertinent issues are repeatedly litigated in many states,294 
generating contentious and heavily criticized decisions, including some of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s most prominent constitutional takings cases.295 
2. The Edges Approach 
The formal boundary approach bred by the unitary property view frus-
trates legal actors as they confront the new challenges that climate change 
has wrought. What is needed is an approach that recognizes the shoreline’s 
nature as an edge with concomitant private and public elements. One such 
edges approach that can be employed to settle disputes over receding shore-
lines is, in fact, already a well-established component of the common law: 
the public trust doctrine.296 This doctrine’s openness to contextual, complex 
                                                                                                                           
 292 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NATIONAL BEACH NOURISHMENT DATA-
BASE, https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/tools/beach-nourishment.html [https://perma.cc/2XCW-
5JLU] (describing four hundred projects involving nearly 1.5 cubic tons of sand). 
 293 See, e.g., City of Long Branch v. Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 560 (N.J. 2010) (holding that expanded 
dry beach, situated on beach previously covered during high tide, that was produced by govern-
ment-funded beach replenishment program constituted an avulsion, and that the increase in beach 
fell within the public trust doctrine and therefore the beachfront property owners had no rights 
there). 
 294 See, e.g., Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 711–12, 732 (Tex. 2012) (applying 
“rolling easement” concept, holding that an avulsion that moves mean high tide line and vegeta-
tion line suddenly, causing former dry beach to become part of State-owned wet beach, did not 
automatically deprive private property owner of her right to exclude public from new dry beach); 
Marion Burke, Comment, Building a Wall to Keep Out the Sea, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1231, 
1231, 1234–36 (2016) (describing ongoing litigation surrounding Superstorm Sandy). 
 295 See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 
707, 732–33 (2010) (finding no unconstitutional taking of littoral property owners' rights to future 
accretions and to contact with the water where State restored eroded beach by filling in submerged 
land in front of owners’ beachfront property); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1031–32 (1992) (holding that a taking occurred where newly enacted state statute prevented 
beachfront landowner from erecting structures on property); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 
U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (holding that a state agency “could not, without paying compensation, condi-
tion grant of permission to rebuild house on property owners’ transfer to public of easement across 
beachfront property”). 
 296 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 727–28 (1986) (discussing the public trust doctrine). 
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solutions that accommodate public and private interests can further help 
courts fashion workable solutions to the conflicts that beach replenishment 
projects engender. 
The public trust doctrine, precluding private ownership of the lands it 
covers and bestowing ownership in the government as the public’s trustee, 
originally applied to submerged lands.297 Its further application to the beach 
was inevitable from the outset, however, given the nature of tidal water bod-
ies.298 Certain portions of the beach fronting tidal water bodies are, by defi-
nition, submerged at times (high-tide time) but not at other times (low-tide 
time). Consequently, through the public trust doctrine, courts have, in dif-
ferent ways, treated the beach more as an edge than as a core private space 
bordering a public one.299 Some state courts hold that the tidal land simply 
cannot be owned by the adjacent private owner based on the fact that such 
land is often submerged.300 Other courts hold that although the owner’s in-
terest does extend to the tidal land because it is not always submerged, that 
ownership interest is subject to a pre-existing public access right.301 Rea-
soning that the public’s expectation of beach access may extend beyond 
these tidal lands or that public rights in tidal lands are meaningless if no 
reasonable access to them is assured, one court has further expanded the 
public’s access rights to privately-owned dry-sand areas (in other words, to 
portions of the beach that are never submerged).302 
Regardless of the relative merits of these individual rulings, all inter-
pretations of the public trust doctrine’s inland reach attest to the judicial 
realization that the task of drawing a clear boundary between private and 
public along the shoreline is futile. Courts aim to establish a combination of 
private and public entitlements to the beach. They thus prescribe that the 
private owner’s rights are not identical in different portions of the beach 
despite the fact that technically all those portions fall on the owner’s side of 
the private/public boundary. 
This edges approach, embodied in the public trust doctrine, can aid in 
solving some of the contentious legal debates that climate change gener-
ates—debates that, as noted above, the formal boundary approach fails to 
                                                                                                                           
 297 See Ill. Cent. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (applying the public trust doctrine to 
submerged lands). 
 298 See Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51 (N.J. 1972) (discussing the appli-
cation of the public trust doctrine to tidal waters). 
 299 For an overview of states’ differing approaches, see Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. 
Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Cli-
mate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 58, 95–98 (2011). 
 300 E.g., Minnesota v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 1971). 
 301 E.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 68–75 (Mich. 2005). 
 302 E.g., Matthews v. Bay Head, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984). 
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coherently settle. For example, in the Texas case of Severance v. Patterson, 
the shore moved inland, thereby leaving the owner’s home on what (accord-
ing to the wet-sand-as-public-trust-asset principle under Texas law) then 
should have been considered public land. In one of the dissents, one justice 
suggested that, although the private house should be allowed to stand, the 
land bordering the water should be treated as a public trust area subject to 
public access rights.303 This proposed solution could have accommodated 
the competingand legitimatepublic and private interests coexisting on 
the property edge that is the beach. It would have done so much more effec-
tively than the majority approach, which insisted instead that the land at 
issue must be fully characterized as either private or public.304 
The same sensitivity to the mix of private and public interests typified 
by the public trust doctrine may also help in developing a rational edges test 
for beach replenishment cases. Useful examples are found in recent New 
Jersey decisions handed down in the wake of Superstorm Sandy and its like. 
Following these devastating events, New Jersey began replenishing beaches 
and constructing dunes to—allegedly—protect beach land. These projects 
are generally disruptive to the private owners of adjoining beach land. The 
builders must traverse their lands to reach project sites. More importantly, at 
these projects’ completion, the beachfront owners would inevitably enjoy 
less direct visual and physical access to the water. Owners have hence 
sought compensation from the government for such projects. 
In response, the New Jersey courts developed a nuanced test to deal 
with these challenges. Under this test, if private owners independently en-
gage in anti-erosion measures that protect not only their own interests but 
those of the public as well, the government cannot demand access through 
their private land to initiate its own anti-erosion projects.305 If, on the other 
hand, the government can prove that the projects it initiates are necessary to 
combat threats that owners cannot reasonably address themselves, the pri-
                                                                                                                           
 303 Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 748–49 (Guzman, J., dissenting). Another possible edges ap-
proach would have allowed the homeowner to remain and use the house but only for a reasonable 
amortization period and/or only on the condition that the house could not be rebuilt if further in-
undation made it uninhabitable. See Gwynne Hunter, Severance v. Patterson: How Do Property 
Rights Move When the Dynamic Sea Meets the Static Shore?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 271, 290–95 
(2013) (urging courts not to take the binary, either private-or-public approach of the Severance 
majority). 
 304 The court then proceeded to label it private, leaving it to the state to exercise its powers to 
claim any public easements therein. Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 732. 
 305 See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Tavasco, No. OCN-L-3290-15 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Aug. 
16, 2018) (holding that private beachfront owners that had invested in a flood control system were 
entitled to a hearing as to whether that investment rendered the government project and public 
easements unnecessary, but also holding that the evidence supported a finding that the government 
project was necessary). 
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vate beachfront owners are only entitled to very modest, essentially symbol-
ic, compensation for their loss of water access.306 In Borough of Harvey 
Cedars v. Karan in 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court invoked this for-
mula, by which any loss borne by the private owners is offset by the benefit 
they reap from the public investment in storm and flood protection, to va-
cate a $375,000 award to private owners for the loss of their water view as a 
result of a dune construction project.307 The landowners ultimately settled 
for a symbolic one dollar.308 In another dune construction case, application 
of the test on remand resulted in the reduction of damages from $275,000 to 
$300.309 
The logic of these rulings is straightforward once one acknowledges 
the edges nature of the beach. Irrespective of any formal property bounda-
ries, the public and the private owners both hold interests in the beach. If 
replenishment is necessary to prevent further beach erosion—for the benefit 
of both the public and the adjacent private owners—the owners reap the 
direct fruits of the government’s expense, so there should be no significant 
compensation obligation. If, on the other hand, the public project is not tru-
ly necessary for such purposes, there is no reason to deprive private owners 
of their rights of direct water access. This approach replaces the irrelevant 
gradual/sudden question with a test that is sensitive to the mix of rights—
public and private—that constantly interact on the shore, a quintessential 
property edge.310 
The edges approach can thus simplify the legal struggle to come to 
terms with global warming’s increasing effects on beaches. Although that 
approach is now urgently necessary, it was always much better suited, as 
                                                                                                                           
 306 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 526 (N.J. 2013). 
 307 See id. For a similarly positive analysis of the case, see Joshua Ulan Galperin & Zaheer 
Hadi Tajani, Resilience and Raisins, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,123, 10,128–29 
(2016). 
 308 Scott Salmon, Necessary Change: Re-calculating Just Compensation for Environmental 
Benefits, 6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV’T 552, 581 (2015). 
 309 Donna Weaver, Jury Awards Harvey Cedars Couple $300 for Easement to Complete Dune 
Project, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (June 30, 2014), https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/
breaking/jury-awards-harvey-cedars-couple-for-easement-to-complete-dune/article_d0ba717a-
009d-11e4-bf66-0019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/V3A5-M53A]; see Joshua Alston, N.J. 
Wins Another Cheap Easement of Beach Dune Project, LAW360 (Sept. 22, 2015), http://law360.
com/articles/553508/nj-wins-another-cheap-easement-for-beachdune-project [https://perma.cc/
33KZ-HMLP] (discussing a 2014 decision in which a New Jersey Superior Court reduced the 
award for homeowners because of the benefits homeowners received from a town-constructed 
dune project). 
 310 Josh Eagle suggests a similar test under the label “waterfront takings test,” through which 
public access and use of private shoreland that is truly necessary for legitimate public purposes 
generally would be permissible without compensation. Eagle, supra note 282, at 903–04. 
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compared to the unitary vision, to contend with the complicated division of 
rights at the space where private land and public waters meet. 
IV. EXTENSION OF THE EDGES CONCEPT: FROM REAL  
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The edges concept provides an accurate and normatively appealing de-
scription of property. Accordingly, it helps in effectively tackling countless 
legal problems in property. This is true not only with respect to property 
interests in land—on which we have focused so far—but also as applied to 
intellectual property. True, the edges idea is probably more intuitive in the 
context of traditional property. Land has a physical edge at or near the 
boundary, where it is easy to visualize the confluence of private and public 
and thus appreciate how the allocation of public and private rights there 
differs from the allocation of such rights at the land’s core. Intellectual 
property, by contrast, is not tangible and thus cannot have a visible edge or 
core. 
Nevertheless, intellectual property law is still, we argue, characterized 
by a property edges-styled logic analogous to that we uncovered in the con-
text of real property law. This contention is not as surprising as it might 
seem at first blush. For property law, the “thing”—which, as noted, for 
some thinkers is property’s defining element—need not be an actual physi-
cal thing: property is about the legal thing, which may or may not be physi-
cal.311 Thus, there is no gulf between tangible and intangible property. In-
deed, a long legal tradition exists of applying the metaphor of property in 
land to intellectual property.312 The equation of intellectual property in-
fringement with trespass to land “remains pervasive,” with intellectual 
property law’s grant of exclusive rights paralleling “a landowner’s legal 
right to exclude others from his land.”313 
Accordingly, property edges thinking can be detected in all fields of in-
tellectual property: patent,314 trademark,315 and, finally, copyright, on which 
                                                                                                                           
 311 See Smith, supra note 47, at 2065 (“In property law, things are the lynchpin of the archi-
tecture . . . . [A] method of making the problem [of horizontal interactions and their interpersonal 
nature] more manageable is to modularize the system, starting with the definition of legal 
things.”). 
 312 See generally Adam J. MacLeod, Patent Infringement as Trespass, 69 ALA. L. REV. 723 
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Copyright and Its Metaphors, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2002) (tracing the land metaphor’s application 
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 313 Rose, supra note 312, at 8. 
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ably infringe if it employs a different principle than the patented invention and represents an inno-
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our discussion here will be focused. Following the framework that we ap-
plied above to explore the edges idea in real property, we will first show, in 
Section A,  that the edges concept provides a better description of the opera-
tion of copyright law than the traditional unitary property concept.316 Then, 
in Section B, we will illustrate how the acknowledgment of this legal reality 
aids in solving a novel problem afflicting copyright’s edges—here, music 
sampling—with which lawmakers still attached to the unitary theory con-
tinue to struggle.317 In this manner, this Part seeks to contribute to debates 
in copyright law and theory, while simultaneously highlighting once more 
the power of the edges concept of property that this Article advances. 
A. Copyright Law Denying the Unitary Concept of Private Property 
Copyright law protects an original work of authorship from use by 
those who do not own it.318 Consequently, many scholars view its function 
as similar to that of trespass protections in property law and as employing 
the same prevalent notion of unitary protection within a boundary.319 Just as 
trespass protects a landowner from outsiders’ invasions into her land, copy-
right’s prohibition on copying protects a work’s owner from outsiders’ inva-
sions into her work. 
Yet, in various ways, copyright law does not treat all that falls within a 
given copyright—every aspect of the original expression that makes up the 
copyrighted work—as warranting equal levels of legal protection from in-
vasion through copying. Instead, copyright law generally treats some copy-
ing of a copyrighted work as too attenuated from the core of the work to 
                                                                                                                           
vation, rather than appropriation. See The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Applied as a Defense to 
Literal Infringement, 2 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 12:56 (2018). 
 315 For example, trademark allows for de minimis copying, and provides a fair use defense to 
infringement where the use serves a legitimate social function (such as promoting product compe-
tition) and does not appropriate more of the trademark than is absolutely necessary. See, e.g., New 
Kids on the Block v. News of Am., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding a fair use, in part, 
because the use did not reproduce the distinctive logo); Gottlieb Dev. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 634–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a trademark’s depiction in the back-
ground of a movie scene is not actionable). 
 316 See infra notes 318–333 and accompanying text. 
 317 See infra notes 334–353 and accompanying text. 
 318 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (conferring on Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102 (2018) (specifying the subject matters of copyright). 
 319 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 433, 472, 473 (2003) (applying copyright law and trespass to chattels doctrines to examine 
developments in using the internet for access to others’ information). 
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warrant legal protection. In other words, in practice if not in theory, copy-
right law adopts an edges—rather than a unitary—view of property. 
That result is achieved through two key doctrinal tools: the definition of 
copyright infringement and the mechanisms of the fair use defense to copy-
right infringement. Copyright law protects works by conferring upon their 
owners the power to seek an injunction or damages against infringing (in oth-
er words, copying) uses.320 To garner a remedy, the copyright holder must 
establish that another work infringed upon her prior work. The test that courts 
employ to identify infringements explicitly employs the language of edges. A 
work is deemed infringing only if it is “substantially similar” to the copy-
righted work, and “substantial similarity requires that the copying is quantita-
tively and qualitatively” meaningful.321 In other words, “a party may be held 
liable when he or she appropriates a large section or a qualitatively important 
section of plaintiff’s work.”322 The “substantial similarity test” entails a quali-
tative, as well as quantitative, aspect and hence cannot be reduced to rote per-
centages. Courts must examine the copyrighted work and draw a qualitative 
distinction between its core—the lifting of such would qualify as substantial, 
rendering the lifting work infringing—and the work’s margins or edges—the 
lifting of such would not qualify as infringing. This assessment is, therefore, 
an inherently fact-intensive, contextual inquiry that explicitly and intentional-
ly avoids the rhetoric of clear boundaries that dominates the unitary vision of 
property.323 Consequently, the edges vision is an innate element of the copy-
right infringement definition. 
The edges vision is built into copyright protection in yet another way: 
through the functioning of the major exception to copyright infringement. 
Even where substantial copying occurs, an infringement might nevertheless 
be excused if it constitutes a “fair use” of the copyrighted work. Incorporat-
ing prior case law, the Copyright Act of 1926 identifies four factors that a 
court must consider in deciding whether the fair use defense applies: (i) the 
purpose and character of the infringing use, (ii) the nature of the copyright-
ed work, (iii) the amount and substantiality of the portion taken, and (iv) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market.324 While the fourth factor can, at 
                                                                                                                           
 320 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018) (listing the exclusive rights of copyright holders); id. §§ 501–
505 (providing remedies for copyright infringement). 
 321 See Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997). The test 
originated in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 322 Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 290 (D.N.J. 1983). 
 323 Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1306–07 
(11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that summary judgment therefore is inappropriate on the substantial 
similarity question). 
 324 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. For a conceptual explication of the fair use defense, see generally 
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2008). 
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times, implicate an edges determination (to ascertain the original work’s 
relevant market), the third factor proactively requires such a determination. 
That factor entails judicial consideration of whether the core of the copy-
righted work was copied. Indeed, an empirical study of published fair use 
opinions found that federal courts rejected fair use claims in thirty-five out 
of thirty-seven cases in which the court concluded that the defendant took 
“the heart” of the plaintiff’s work.325 By contrast, in the opinions in which 
courts concluded that the defendant did not take “the heart” of the plaintiff’s 
work, they recognized the fair use defense in all but two cases.326 A copying 
of a work’s edges, rather than core, thus appears much more likely to quali-
fy for the fair use defense.327 
One of the most famous Supreme Court fair use cases illustrates this 
point. The 1985 case of Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, involved a 
challenge brought by the publisher of President Gerald Ford’s memoirs 
against a magazine that had published excerpts from the book without re-
ceiving permission from the publisher.328 The Court refused to recognize a 
fair use defense for the magazine because the infringing article copied lan-
guage that the Court deemed to be at the core, rather than the edges, of the 
unpublished autobiography. “In absolute terms, the words actually quoted 
were an insubstantial portion” of the copyrighted memoir.329 Nevertheless, 
the Court held that those words were “what was essentially the heart of the 
book.”330 Specifically, the portions taken were those pertaining to Ford’s 
pardoning of his disgraced predecessor, President Richard Nixon—arguably 
the most momentous decision of Ford’s brief presidency which many be-
lieve later doomed his election prospects. An editor described those chap-
ters as “the most interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript.”331 
The magazine “quoted these passages precisely because they qualitatively 
embodied Ford’s distinctive expression.”332 In view of the excerpts’ “key 
                                                                                                                           
 325 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 616 (2008). 
 326 See id. 
 327 See WILLIAM PALTRY, PALTRY ON FAIR USE § 5.1 (2018) (explaining that “[n]umerous 
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 328 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 329 Id. at 564. 
 330 Id. at 565. 
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role in the infringed work,” the Court concluded that they could not be 
characterized as an “infinitesimal amount” despite their paltry length.333 
Harper & Row identified the infringement to the copyrighted work as 
going to that work’s heart—and therefore as actionable. The mere fact that 
an infringement had occurred—that some portion of the work had been cop-
ied—did not suffice to warrant a remedy. What mattered was which specific 
portion that was copied. The analogy relevant to copyright law is thus not 
the unitary land boundary that can never be crossed. Rather, if one were to 
analogize a copyrighted work like a novel to real property like land, copy-
right law in effect dictates that only some trespasses into the novel’s land 
are actionableonly those that are substantial, by virtue of the specific lo-
cation in the work into which they intrude. 
B. An Edges Solution to a Current Copyright Problem: Music Sampling 
Like real property law, copyright law employs an edges vision of prop-
erty. Also as in real property law, however, courts at times stray and fall back 
on a unitary property vision—especially when a new technology enables a 
new type of intrusion into the property’s edges. Thus, in the context of copy-
right, to a similar extent as elsewhere, greater attention to the edges approach 
that this Article propagates can facilitate salutary legal reforms. To demon-
strate, we detail the case of music sampling. 
The practice and legal challenge of sampling arose following the prolif-
eration, starting in the 1980s, of a new technology that allowed snippets of 
sound recordings to be copied, modified, and made part of a new record-
ing.334 Hip hop artists employed this technology to create recordings consist-
ing of dozens or even hundreds of samples.335 As such computer-generated 
music grew to occupy a prominent position in popular music, a legal chal-
lenge emerged. Sampled works are copyrighted, and thus any sampling gen-
erates a potential infringement claim—indeed, a myriad of such claims.336 
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was the 
first to confront the problem in Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films.337 At 
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issue was a recording, “Get Off,” which opened with a three-note combina-
tion solo guitar “riff” lasting four seconds. The riff contained a two-second 
sample that was copied from a protected work, albeit at a lower pitch and af-
ter being “looped” and extended to sixteen beats.338 The United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found that those two-seconds did 
not “rise to the level of a legally cognizable appropriation.”339 On appeal, 
however, the Sixth Circuit disagreed. Holding that there was no de minimis 
exception to the prohibition against a sound recording’s copying, it concluded 
that even a one-second sample could be actionable. The court found ground-
ing for this absolutist position in amendments to the Copyright Act enacted in 
1971.340 The amendments predated the technology enabling music sampling, 
and therefore, do not explicitly state that an owner can enjoin the practice.341 
Nevertheless, the court read the statute as intending to empower owners in 
this fashion. It partially based this peculiar reading of the statute on the notion 
that clear property rights lead to efficient transactions.342 It predicted that the 
realization among musicians that sampling would be actionable would re-
move uncertainty and incentivize samplers to pay copyright-holders, thereby 
facilitating creativity.343 Therefore, the court adopted a unitary, distinctly non-
edges approach to copyright disputes involving sampling: all infringements of 
music recordings were to be treated alike. 
The Bridgeport Music decision has been heavily criticized.344 Its logic 
appears lacking. The rationale that samplers can simply bargain with each 
rights-holder is untenable. It ignores the daunting transaction costs for such 
bargaining given the prevalence of musical creation via computer, in which 
any given recording might contain hundreds of samples and in which those 
sampled often had also engaged in sampling.345 Due to the potentially debil-
itating effects on the music industry—particularly on hip hop artists—
commentators expressed “outrage that the Sixth Circuit had read a statute 
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designed to protect creative enterprises in a manner that would instead stifle 
creativity.”346 
A rational, edges approach to sampling would avoid such undesirable 
outcomes that are inevitable when drawing on the misleading unitary proper-
ty vision. An edges template is offered by the more recent United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision in VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone in 
2016.347 The case involved the early 1990s Madonna hit “Vogue”; the plain-
tiff alleged that the “Vogue” producer had copied a “horn hit” from an earlier 
song, known as “Love Break,” and used a modified snippet in “Vogue.”348 
Rejecting the lawsuit—and implicitly the Sixth Circuit’s unitary approach—
the Ninth Circuit held that although a recording’s creator may have a right to 
exclude others from even small samples, that right only applies where the 
sample is used in a way removing something akin to the creation’s core.349 
Investigating statutory history, the court reasoned that infringement occurs 
when a substantial portion of the actual sounds that constitute a copyrighted 
recording is reproduced.350 This test is not quantitative. Thus here, although 
the Ninth Circuit noted that the sample was short (one quarter-note of a four-
note chord, lasting 0.23 seconds), length itself was not the determining fac-
tor.351 Under the court’s reasoning, the shortest of samples could be actiona-
ble if it appropriated something at the core of the copyrighted property, rather 
than at its edges. The test, for the court, was whether the sampling takes the 
original recording’s distinctive, or signature, sound as conceived by the aver-
age listener. That was not the case here.352 As the court explained, “[e]ven if 
one grants the dubious proposition that a listener recognized some similarities 
between the horn hits in the two songs, it is hard to imagine that he or she 
would conclude that sampling had occurred.”353 
The Ninth Circuit thus reaffirmed copyright as protecting property 
right holders while accommodating the public interest in dynamism in the 
arts. More important for this Article’s purposes, however, the decision rati-
fied copyright as a body of property law that meaningfully distinguishes the 
core from the edges of the asset owned. The court internalized property 
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law’s message that not all property infringements are created equal. Just as 
an entry into the home is not, for legal purposes, identical to an entry into 
land’s outskirts or to the air above the land, so too is an excerpt that encap-
sulates the essence of a work-of-art not identical to a marginal, hardly iden-
tifiable, extract. 
CONCLUSION 
For too long, property law scholarship has been obsessed with bounda-
ries, with hard lines that divide what is inside the private property from 
what is outside of it. This unitary conception of property ignores the fact 
that inevitably any property has outer reaches that are within the property 
boundary but not at the property’s core. These edges simply cannot be—and 
are not—treated by the law as if they were at the core. Espousing property 
edges as a discursive category—indeed, simply adding edges to the vocabu-
lary of property—helps us understand a plethora of court decisions and leg-
islative edicts that do not square with a unitary conception of property. 
Equally important, the recognition of edges as a distinct property catego-
ry with descriptive and normative heft can help legal institutions address the 
myriad controversies over the private-public divide that crop up in the after-
math of new developments as diverse as climate change, drones, the digital 
revolution, and improved research on lead’s poisonous effects. In approach-
ing these controversies, lawmakers sometimes reach stilted, unsatisfactory 
results because they insist on fetishizing the property boundary line. Better 
solutionsones that accommodate the interests of both the private owner and 
the publicare imaginable only if lawmakers steadfastly hold to the edges 
idea of property. The edges idea is perhaps intuitive, and existing property 
theories could have perhaps easily assimilated it in the past had they explicit-
ly addressed it. Nevertheless, they have not done so, and as long as the edges 
idea remains unstated, it is too often forgotten—to our property system’s det-
riment. 
 
